Two hours of live TV, the only head-to-head before the runoff. Every checkable claim by both candidates, held to the same standard and traced to primary sources.
On 29 October, Bulgaria's two presidential runoff candidates met in their only debate on public broadcaster BNT: Iliana Yotova, the sitting president, backed by Prime Minister Rumen Radev's Progressive Bulgaria, and Andrey Gyurov, the former caretaker prime minister, running as a civic candidate. Over two hours they said a lot that sounded like fact: who signed what, what a contract costs, what the Constitutional Court ruled, who pardoned whom. Most of it can be checked.
Here is every one of those claims, with the quote, the verdict, the reasoning and a link to the primary source. Scrub through the debate in the player, or open a row in the table to see the evidence. The quotes are translated from Bulgarian; each one links to the exact moment in the recording.
Both candidates were checked the same way, with the same sources and the same scale.
The number of false claims is not, by itself, a measure of honesty: the two did not make the same number of checkable claims, and not all claims weigh the same. That is why each claim has its own explanation and sources: click the row.
Press ▶ or drag along the bar to scrub through the debate. Every tick is a checked claim.
The evidence ▼| Time | Who | Claim | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0:13:51 | Yotova | Yotova claims that on 29 October some of the formations backing Gyurov sought the official support of DPS-New Beginning and of Peevski. | Misleading |
“But today, for example, I saw that some of the formations backing Mr Gyurov sought the official support of DPS-New Beginning and of Mr Peevski.” Misleading
We did not find any official request for support from DPS-New Beginning or from Peevski by PP, DB or other parties backing Gyurov. On 29 October 2026 the informal association “Forum for Democratic Action” published an appeal “To the supporters of GERB and DPS” to back Gyurov and Kandev. The appeal is addressed to voters, not to the party leadership, and Peevski is not mentioned in it. The association is not a party and is not among the declared supporters of the candidacy. On the same day Gyurov stated on air that he had not sought and would not seek support from party leaders. There is a genuine element (an appeal to DPS voters on the same day), but describing it as “official support of DPS-New Beginning and Peevski” sought by the formations backing Gyurov creates a false impression. Sources
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| 0:14:27 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that there are no representatives of State Security in his initiative committee, implying that there are in Yotova's committee. | Mostly true |
“And there are no representatives of State Security either.” Mostly true
The hint about Yotova's committee is borne out. CEC Decision No. 187-PVR contains the 149 names on her committee, among them Georgi Parvanov, Krasimir Karakachanov, Ivan Marazov, Ivan Tokadzhiev, Ivo Hadzhimishev and Bobi Bobev. Researcher Hristo Hristov (desebg.com) checked the list against the register of the Dossier Commission and found at least 14 people with declared affiliation to State Security, disclosed by decisions from 2007 to 2016. For his own committee (over 220 people), we found no published check, nor any data on a State Security collaborator. The Dossier Commission checks registered candidates, not members of initiative committees. So the absence is not proven, only not disproven. The sentence comes immediately after his claim that there are no politically affiliated people on his committee. That claim is false according to DW and Club Z, because it includes current and former party figures. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г2) за неговия комитет; Недоказано (Г5) за нейния | |||
| 0:16:37 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that while Bulgaria was blocking North Macedonia with a veto, the whole EU was against it, and that with the French proposal Bulgaria's position became the EU's position. | Mostly true |
“I can give an example with the French proposal for R.S. In North Macedonia, back then, when we stood on the sidelines with a veto, look, everyone from the entire European Union was against us. With the French proposal, what we actually managed to do,” Mostly true
The blockade is a fact. From November 2020 to June 2022 Bulgaria did not consent to a negotiating framework with North Macedonia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 November 2020). The second part is supported by the documents. Following the National Assembly's decision of 24 June 2022, the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on 18 July 2022. They name the 2017 Treaty with Bulgaria as an obligation, welcome the protocol under Art. 12, and tie the second intergovernmental conference to the inclusion of Bulgarians in North Macedonia's constitution (Council of the EU, 11440/22). In this way Bulgaria's bilateral conditions became part of the European framework. “Everyone from the entire EU was against us” is an exaggeration. Bulgaria's isolation on the issue was considerable, but the phrase is not literally provable. Sources
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| 0:19:49 | Yotova | Yotova claims that about a month ago, at the UN General Assembly, before the leaders of 193 countries, she raised the issue of security and safe navigation in the Black Sea for the first time. | Mostly true |
“I did it about a month ago. I did it before the UN General Assembly. That was when I raised for the first time the grave issue of security” Mostly true
Yotova spoke in the general debate of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2026, 36 days before the debate. The Black Sea was the main topic of the speech: she called for the sea to be turned “from a zone of heightened risk” into a zone of security and announced a Bulgarian initiative for free and safe navigation (president.bg, 23 September 2026). The UN has 193 member states, so that part is also true. “For the first time” is true only if it refers to her personally or to a standalone navigation initiative. Bulgaria has spoken about the Black Sea from the UN rostrum before: in September 2023 Rumen Radev expressed concern that the war was spreading to the Black Sea region (BNR, 21 September 2023). That speech, however, contained no separate proposal on navigation. The claim that many leaders congratulated her after the speech cannot be verified from public sources. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Й10): говорила е пред ОС на ООН за Черно море | |||
| 0:20:42 | Yotova | Yotova claims that shortly after her UN speech (23 September 2026) the first attacks in the Black Sea began. | Misleading |
“Unfortunately, this banal topic was refuted in the most dangerous way, because shortly after that the first attacks in the Black Sea began.” Misleading
The first strikes on merchant ships in Bulgaria's exclusive economic zone did come after the speech. On the night into 6 October 2026, about 70 miles east of Byala, the “Alfa Vatan” (which sank) and the “Able” were hit (Boulevard Bulgaria, 6 October 2026). That was 13 days after the speech. If it refers to Bulgarian waters, the claim is true. But she says “the first attacks in the Black Sea”, and there had been attacks at sea before the speech. On 16 September 2026 the insurance market's Joint War Committee declared almost the entire Black Sea a listed risk area. The reason: in the 12 months to 21 September, 45 merchant ships had been hit outside the old listed area, compared with none a year earlier (Ambrey, 23 September 2026). The joint statement circulated at the UN on the day of the speech also expressed alarm at “the attacks in the Black Sea” (esteri.it, 23 September 2026). In her speech Yotova herself said that the war had already “gone beyond the territorial waters” of the warring parties. Her remark in the debate gives the impression that she issued a warning before there were any attacks. In fact, strikes in the western part of the sea had already been increasing, and the attacks in Bulgarian waters were their next step. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Й17): изявлението от 23.09 вече споменава атаки в Черно море | |||
| 0:22:15 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that a “UN resolution” provided for an end to hostilities, that Bulgaria first supported it and that Yotova then distanced herself from it on Facebook. | Mostly true |
“In this case it is very important to say that the UN resolution itself envisaged a cessation of hostilities. And our position, which was first in support, and then Mrs Yotova distanced herself from the position,” Mostly true
The document is not a resolution. It is a joint statement by the EU and around 50 countries, presented in New York on 23 September 2026 by Kaja Kallas, Jean-Noël Barrot and Andrii Sybiha ahead of a Security Council briefing on Ukraine (esteri.it, 23 September 2026). The General Assembly did not vote on it. On this point Gyurov is wrong. The rest matches the facts. The statement notes that Ukraine has accepted a full and unconditional ceasefire since March 2025 and calls on Russia to do the same. Bulgaria is on the list of countries that joined it, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the decision to join by its support for European unity (BTA, 24 September 2026). That same evening Yotova wrote on Facebook that the statement “is not signed”, that she had not attended the meeting and that Bulgaria's proposed amendments had not been accepted. The chronology (joining, then distancing on Facebook) and the content (a call for a ceasefire) are accurate. Only the label “resolution” is inaccurate, but it is exactly what allows Yotova to rebut the whole argument. Sources
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| 0:23:28 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the Consultative Council for National Security was convened too late, after weeks of signs of escalation, and ended without specific decisions and goals. | Misleading |
“Convening the consultative council too late, after there had already been indications, for weeks on end, that there would be an escalation, it came too late, without specific decisions” Misleading
The Consultative Council for National Security met on 7 October 2026, the day after the first strikes on ships in Bulgaria's economic zone (president.bg, 8 October 2026). There were signs of the danger earlier too. On 8 August a drone exploded on Bulgarian territory near the border with Romania (gov.bg, 8 August 2026). On 16 September insurers declared almost the entire sea a listed risk area, and on 23 September Yotova herself warned of the risk at the UN. Whether the council was convened “late” is a judgement, but it has a factual basis. The claim “without specific decisions” does not match the published text. By law, the council adopts opinions, not binding decisions. The opinion of 7 October, however, contains itemised proposals addressed to the executive and the legislature. Among them: surveillance with unmanned systems, accelerated acquisition of anti-drone systems with kinetic effect, amendments to the laws on the protection of strategic sites, a request to NATO for more allied assets under Eastern Sentry, consultations with Romania and Turkey, and a request to the International Maritime Organization. Gyurov is right that the measures lack deadlines, responsible institutions and measurable targets. It is not true, however, that there are no specific measures. Sources
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| 0:23:58 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that ships have already sunk near the Bulgarian coast. | True |
“and we already have ships sunk near our coast.” True
By the day of the debate, at least three merchant ships had sunk near the Bulgarian coast after drone strikes. On 6 October 2026 the “Alfa Vatan” (Togo flag) sank about 70 miles east of Byala (Boulevard Bulgaria). On 13 October, during the attack on the “Chelsea 3” east of Byala, the government also reported a second ship, hit 17 miles east of Krapets, which sank (gov.bg, 13 October 2026). The container ship CONTSHIP JET was hit on 28 October off Cape Kaliakra and sank around midnight, that is, hours before the debate (Club Z, 29 October 2026). The ships sank in the exclusive economic zone, not in territorial waters. The phrase “near the coast” is accurate: off Krapets the distance is 17 miles. Sources
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| 0:24:47 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the UN General Assembly resolution Gyurov is talking about does not exist and that it is a statement. | True |
“I maintain that there is no United Nations resolution from the General Assembly.” True
The document is the “Joint statement ahead of the high-level briefing of the UN Security Council on Ukraine” of 23 September 2026. It was presented by the EU High Representative and the French and Ukrainian foreign ministers on behalf of the EU and around 50 countries (esteri.it, 23 September 2026). It is a political declaration by a group of states. It is not an act of the General Assembly and was not voted on. The General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the war in Ukraine on other occasions. The specific document in dispute, however, is not one of them. Sources
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| 0:25:12 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the statement mentions the Black Sea in only one sentence, so it does not protect Bulgaria's interest and she did not support it. | Misleading |
“which you may be referring to, there was no way for Bulgaria's national interest to be protected, and in particular on the Black Sea. This” Misleading
The statement of 23 September 2026 speaks of the Black Sea in two consecutive passages. The first expresses alarm at the attacks there. The second supports efforts towards an arrangement on freedom of navigation and the protection of merchant ships and infrastructure (esteri.it). The topic does take up little space, but “one sentence” is not accurate. More importantly, on 24 September she explained her distancing with other arguments. In her Facebook position she writes that the text is not signed, that Bulgaria had no opportunity to enter reservations, that its proposed amendments were not accepted and that “there is no military solution”. The Black Sea is not mentioned there (BTA, 24 September 2026; Novinite.bg, 25 September 2026). The Black Sea argument appears only now, in the debate. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Й27): две изречения | |||
| 0:26:08 | Yotova | Yotova claims that she does not recall Bulgaria ever imposing a veto in the EU and that the country has taken part in drafting all documents. | False |
“And second, I don't recall when Bulgaria ever imposed a veto on anything. On the contrary, we have taken part in drafting all documents, in all formats in which we take part.” False
On 17 November 2020, at the General Affairs Council, Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva stated that Bulgaria “cannot at this stage support” the draft negotiating framework with North Macedonia and the convening of an intergovernmental conference (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 November 2020). The decision requires unanimity, so Bulgaria's position blocked the start of negotiations until July 2022. In the EU and in public discourse this is called “the Bulgarian veto”. The presidency supported this blockade. In the opinion of the Consultative Council for National Security of 10 January 2022 it is described as “Bulgaria's consistently upheld refusal to approve the start of negotiations” (president.bg, 11 January 2022). Yotova was vice president at the time. Sources
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| 0:27:45 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Bulgaria refused to join a NATO counter-drone initiative, with the defence minister citing a price of 220,000 euros as too high, and that it joined late, after the escalation. | Mostly true |
“I mean NATO's [counter-drone initiative], where Bulgaria refused to join, as the defence minister cited a price of 220 thousand euros, that it's too expensive for us. And now we see the results of this action, and in a belated plan, after things had already escalated, Bulgaria decided to join.” Mostly true
The refusal and the delay are documented. On 11 September 2026, during parliamentary scrutiny, Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said that Bulgaria “cannot afford with the available financial resources” to take part in two initiatives of a similar nature. This concerns the NATO anti-drone initiative announced in Ankara (National Assembly transcript, 11 September 2026). On 14 October, after the attacks, he clarified that Bulgaria is in Drone Edge. In the separate NATO project against low-flying aerial threats, launched on 13 February 2025, it “has not taken part”, but will now prepare a request to join (National Assembly transcript, 14 October 2026). On 28 October the Council of Ministers approved the accession (BTA, 28 October 2026). Gyurov, however, links the two statements inaccurately. In September the minister spoke of a lack of resources without naming a sum. The figure of 220,000 euros a year for a three-year period appears only on 14 October, and at that point the minister said that the country “can afford it”. The refusal was justified on financial grounds, but not by the “expensive” 220,000 euros. Sources
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| 0:28:17 | Yotova | Yotova claims that what Gyurov said is “absolutely untrue”, because the government submitted documents and registered Bulgaria's participation in the programme despite the minister's statement about the cost. | Misleading |
“Ms Zlatareva, what we just heard is absolutely untrue. The government submitted the documents for participation in this programme. Yes, there was a statement by the defence minister about how much it would cost Bulgaria, and despite that we registered our participation there.” Misleading
It is true that the government is joining. On 28 October 2026, the day before the debate, the Council of Ministers approved accession to the memorandum of seven countries on air defence against low-flying threats and a draft note on accession, subject to subsequent ratification (BTA, 28 October 2026). It is not true that what Gyurov said is “absolutely untrue”. On 11 September the defence minister declined participation for financial reasons (National Assembly transcript, 11 September 2026). On 14 October he himself admitted that Bulgaria “has not joined from 2025 until now” and that the request to join “will be prepared” (National Assembly transcript, 14 October 2026). The documents were approved six weeks after the refusal and after the strikes on ships, which confirms Gyurov's point about a belated decision. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й31): на 14.10 искането още се подготвя | |||
| 0:29:52 | Yotova | Yotova claims that work on developing drone defence systems began only in recent months, since the Radev government took office. | Misleading |
“and it's good that in recent months, since this government has been in place, this work began.” Misleading
The Radev government was elected on 8 May 2026 (BTA) and has indeed taken steps: the Drone Edge application, the accession on 28 October. But the work did not begin with it. In September 2025 the then defence minister Atanas Zapryanov announced that Bulgaria would buy its own anti-drone systems with a loan under the EU's SAFE mechanism (BNR, 29 September 2025). The agreement with Ukraine, signed in Kyiv on 30 March 2026 by the caretaker cabinet, provides for joint training on unmanned systems and countering them, as well as technology transfer and joint testing (text of the agreement, gov.bg). Minister Stoyanov himself referred on 14 October to the project for 20 systems under SAFE. Sources
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| 0:30:05 | Gyurov | Gyurov asks why Yotova and Radev, as the presidency and supreme commander-in-chief over the past seven years, did nothing to get better defence systems. | Mostly true |
“My question would be, since you and Mr Radev were in the presidency for the last 7 years, and as supreme commander-in-chief, why didn't you do anything so that we have better defence systems and a better ability to defend ourselves against modern threats?” Mostly true
Radev and Yotova took office on 22 January 2017. Radev was president until 23 January 2026, when the Constitutional Court terminated his powers following his resignation, and Yotova has been head of state since then (president.bg, biography). The period is almost nine years, not seven. Gyurov understates it. Under the Constitution, the president is supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Art. 100). The suggestion “you did nothing” is a judgement and is not checked here. The Constitution (Art. 105) assigns the management of defence and the budget to the Council of Ministers, and arms procurement goes through the government and parliament. The president has advisory instruments such as the Consultative Council for National Security, but no direct control over procurement. Sources
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| 0:34:48 | Yotova | Yotova claims that two days ago Finland and Norway “set off to negotiate” with Putin and that Alexander Stubb, with whom she worked for many years, has begun a direct dialogue with him. | Mostly true |
“And despite that, Alexander Stubb, with whom I have worked for many years, he went into direct dialogue with Putin, because he knows that this is the only way the war can be ended.” Mostly true
On 27 October 2026, two days before the debate, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre spoke by phone with Putin on their own initiative (President of Finland, 27 October 2026). The call followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October and was held after consultation with Ukraine. Stubb said that ending the war “requires direct talks”. The date and the direct contact match. “Negotiating”, however, is a strong word. According to the Finnish announcement, the two conveyed messages about future negotiations linked to upcoming meetings in Abu Dhabi. They spoke as leaders of their own countries, not on behalf of Europe, and report no agreements. This is diplomatic contact, not peace negotiations. Sources
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| 0:35:59 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Gyurov, as caretaker prime minister, signed in Kyiv, without a mandate from parliament, a 10-year agreement with commitments for the state, 20 days before the elections and 20 days before the end of his term. | Mostly true |
“You went to Kyiv, you didn't even think it necessary to tell me, without a mandate from the National Assembly, and you signed an agreement 20 days before the elections, 20 days before you stopped being caretaker prime minister, with which for 10 years you made the state take on certain commitments.” Mostly true
The Security Cooperation Agreement was signed in Kyiv on 30 March 2026 by Andrey Gyurov and Volodymyr Zelensky. According to its final provisions, it is “valid for a period of ten (10) years”. The elections were called by decree of 19 February 2026 for 19 April. There are exactly 20 days between the two dates. There is no mandate from parliament. At the extraordinary sitting on 1 April 2026, MPs from several groups said that the National Assembly had not given prior approval and had not been informed. Vazrazhdane's draft to terminate the agreement was not voted on because quorum was lost (91 MPs registered). The second date is wrong. The Gyurov cabinet did not end 20 days after the signing. The 52nd National Assembly elected Rumen Radev as prime minister on 8 May 2026, 39 days after the signing. The word “commitments” has support in the text, but with a caveat: the agreement itself says that it “does not fall within the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” and “provides for political commitments”. The government explains that it contains no legally binding obligations. A mandate from parliament is not legally required for such a document. The question is political: whether a caretaker cabinet should sign a 10-year document while a parliament is in place. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й45 Опровергано (20 дни преди края на мандата: кабинетът остава до 08.05); Й44 и Й46 Потвърдено (без мандат; 10 години, политически ангажименти) | |||
| 0:36:59 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that in Bulgaria there have been explosions and downed drones, sunken ships and sailors killed, and that the Black Sea has become less safe than the Persian Gulf. | Mostly true |
“I just want to say that we have explosions on our territory, we have downed drones, we have sunken ships, there are sailors who have died. In fact, the Black Sea has become less safe than the Persian Gulf.” Mostly true
Explosion and downed drones: on 8 August 2026 a drone that entered from Romania exploded about 100 m inside Bulgarian territory and 1 km from a compressor station of the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline (gov.bg, 8 August 2026). On 14 October in parliament the prime minister also spoke of “the drone that fell near Kardam” (National Assembly transcript, 14 October 2026). There are sunken ships (see the check of p1-30). Sailors killed: the crew of the “Alfa Vatan” has not been found. The search was called off on 6 October, and the head of the rescue centre said that there “probably will not be” any traces (Fakti, 7 October 2026). The number of sailors has not been officially confirmed. In the same parliamentary transcript Radev says “we have people killed”. Two deaths were confirmed in a strike on 5 October, but in the Romanian zone. The Persian Gulf: the comparison has a basis. The Financial Times, citing data from Ambrey and the International Maritime Organization, describes the Black Sea as the deadliest shipping route for 2026. Over 570 ships have been hit there and at least 40 sailors killed, compared with 120 incidents and 24 deaths in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East (Riviera, 27 October 2026). These data, however, describe the sea as a whole, where most strikes are off Ukraine and Russia. Market estimates show a much lower insurance risk for voyages to Bulgaria and Romania. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено за падналите дронове (Г27); за Персийския залив: няма официален документ, който да сравнява | |||
| 0:37:53 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the BOTAS contract was signed by a caretaker government for 13 years, that there is no way out of it and that Bulgaria will be paying under it for 13 years. | Mostly true |
“Whereas, for example, the agreement or contract with BOTAS, which was again signed by a caretaker government for 13 years, that is a door that cannot be closed.” Mostly true
The Ministry of Energy reports that the agreement between Bulgargaz and BOTAS was signed on 3 January 2023 at the Council of Ministers, under caretaker energy minister Rosen Hristov of the Galab Donev cabinet, appointed by President Radev. The term is 13 years (Ministry of Energy, 3 January 2023). This part is true. On “a door that cannot be closed”: according to published information, the contract has no renegotiation or termination clause, and terminating it unilaterally would cost about 3 billion leva in compensation (BTA, July 2026). In 2025 Minister Zhecho Stankov estimated the cost of exit at over 2 billion euros. There really is no way out without a huge penalty. A significant fact is left out. On 6 July 2026 Bulgargaz and BOTAS signed a protocol freezing the contract for 15 months. During that time only the capacity actually used is paid for, and the parties are renegotiating the terms (Council of Ministers, 6 July 2026). So the “door” has not been shut, but it has at least been partly closed. It is therefore not certain that Bulgaria will pay on the original terms for the full 13 years. The assessment “one person has all the power” (p2-34) is political and is not assessed. It is worth clarifying that on 3 January 2023 the 48th National Assembly was still sitting: it was dissolved by decree of 2 February 2023 (BNT). Sources
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| 0:38:03 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that because of the BOTAS contract Bulgaria pays half a million every day (once he says dollars) and that this obligation cannot be ended. | Misleading |
“Every day we pay half a million dollars because of this contract.” Misleading
Under the original terms, the reserved capacity fee is about 1 million leva a day (about 512 thousand euros), payable whether or not gas is transported. Minister Stankov gives “about 1,050,000 leva” a day (BTA, 21 May 2025). The order of magnitude of “half a million” (euros, or a little over half a million dollars) is correct for the original contract. The present tense (“every day we pay”), however, does not match the facts as of the date of the debate. First, Bulgargaz has not paid the monthly capacity invoices since July 2024: the sums are accumulating as a liability, not being paid. Second, under the protocol of 6 July 2026 the contract is frozen for 15 months, and during this period only the capacity actually used is paid for (Council of Ministers, 6 July 2026). Prime Minister Radev stated that unused capacity will not be paid for (Mediapool, July 2026). It is true that the contract is very expensive: Bulgargaz's loss for 2025 is 267.2 million leva, of which 250.4 million leva are costs for unused capacity under BOTAS (News.bg, 8 July 2026). The claim that “no one can close” the obligation also ignores the freeze and the renegotiation that has begun. Both of these happened almost four months before the debate. Sources
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| 0:38:09 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Yotova did not criticise the caretaker government that signed the BOTAS contract when it was concluded. | True |
“And Mrs Yotova, I didn't hear your opinion on this contract, and why back then, when it was signed,” True
We found no public criticism by Yotova of the contract or of the Donev cabinet in this regard, either in 2023 or later. She has spoken about the contract in a positive tone. On 2 February 2023, a month after the signing, Vice President Yotova said after a meeting with Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay that the BOTAS–Bulgargaz agreement had been concluded three weeks after the Radev–Erdoğan meeting and had secured gas supplies for Bulgaria (BTA, 2 February 2023). On 11 April 2025 she said that the contract had been concluded in an “extremely difficult and uncertain period”, that it had guaranteed security of supply and that it could be renegotiated (BTA, 11 April 2025). In the debate itself she defended it: “it will yet prove useful”. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г32): няма официален документ, сверяват само с официални източници | |||
| 0:38:32 | Yotova | Yotova claims that through the agreement Gyurov committed Bulgaria to handing over the reactors from the Belene nuclear power plant to Ukraine. | Misleading |
“this is not an open door. These are commitments undertaken. You undertook the commitments for us to hand over reactors to the Ukrainians, the reactors from Belene.” Misleading
The agreement says: “The Participants will continue to work on the potential sale of equipment acquired for the Belene NPP project to Ukraine and will take the necessary steps to finalise the process.” So there is a political commitment to work towards a deal, not just an “open door”. This is about a sale, however, and a “potential” one, not a handover. The process did not start with Gyurov. By decision of 6 July 2023 (State Gazette, issue 59/2023), the 49th National Assembly instructed the energy minister to negotiate with Ukraine the sale of the equipment at a price not lower than 601,617,133 euros. That is why the text says “will continue”. In Kyiv, Gyurov stated that the decision on the reactors must be taken by parliament. The Radev government is continuing the same talks. On 3 July 2026 Radev said in parliament that he had discussed the reactors with Zelensky and had proposed to him that Belene be built jointly with European funds. The agreement by itself transfers nothing. Sources
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| 0:38:41 | Yotova | Yotova claims that through the agreement Gyurov undertook commitments to produce drones, and hints at a personal interest on his part or that of his sponsors. | Misleading |
“You undertook commitments to produce drones. Maybe you or your sponsors are personally interested in this.” Misleading
The text contains no clause on drone production. Joint production is mentioned for “priority weapons and ammunition” and “industrial lines for the joint production of the necessary types of ammunition”. Unmanned vehicles appear as a technology for which the parties recognise the benefits of technology transfer and joint experimental testing, as well as in training (unmanned systems and countering them). Yotova does have some basis. At the press conference after the signing, Zelensky announced “joint production of various weapons, including drones” on the territory of both countries (Kyiv Independent). This is an intention stated around the signing, not a commitment in the document. For it to happen, separate contracts and financing would be needed. No evidence is given for the hint of personal interest, and it is not assessed as a fact. Sources
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| 0:38:49 | Yotova | Yotova claims that through the agreement Bulgaria committed itself to the Coalition of the Willing, and that this means Bulgarian soldiers being present in Ukraine after a ceasefire. | Misleading |
“You undertook the commitment, through this agreement, for Bulgaria to take part in the coalition of the willing. That is, this means the presence of Bulgarian soldiers after some eventual ceasefire in Ukraine. Something I categorically object to, and that is my position” Misleading
The first part has grounds. In the section “Just and lasting peace”, the agreement says that the participants “highly value the important work of the Coalition of the Willing and reaffirm their commitment to its activities”. This is a political declaration. The second part does not follow from the text. The document says not a word about sending Bulgarian troops to Ukraine. It provides for training Ukrainian military personnel in Bulgaria and through the EU and NATO, as well as for Ukrainian officers sailing on Bulgarian ships. According to the Paris Declaration of 6 January 2026, the multinational force is formed from the contributions of “willing states” and is deployed after a ceasefire. Each state decides for itself whether to take part. Sending Bulgarian armed forces outside the country can only be authorised by the National Assembly (Art. 84(11) of the Constitution). The then prime minister Zhelyazkov described Bulgaria's contribution to the coalition as early as October 2025: mine countermeasure and auxiliary ships and airport infrastructure, with no soldiers. Foreign Minister Petrova-Chamova says that there is no membership format. Sources
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| 0:39:26 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Gyurov was caretaker prime minister while the National Assembly was functioning and did not ask it before signing the agreement. | True |
“You were caretaker prime minister at a time when the National Assembly was functioning.” True
After the 2023 amendments to the Constitution (State Gazette, issue 106), Art. 99(5) no longer provides for the president to dissolve parliament when appointing a caretaker government. Art. 64(4) says that the powers of the outgoing National Assembly end only when the newly elected MPs take the oath. The decree of 19 February 2026 appoints the cabinet and calls elections, but does not dissolve parliament. The 51st National Assembly did in fact sit after the signing. On 1 April 2026 it held an extraordinary sitting (182 MPs registered at the opening) and discussed exactly this agreement. A BSP MP said “we have a functioning parliament”. There is no evidence that the government submitted the draft to parliament or asked for its opinion before 30 March. In the same sitting, MPs said that parliament had not been informed and had not been presented with a draft. There is no legal obligation to consult: in 2024 Speaker Kiselova stated that signing is within the government's competence. Still, the fact itself that Gyurov did not ask parliament is true. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й51 и Й52 Потвърдено | |||
| 0:39:30 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the agreement was written two years before Gyurov went to Kyiv, that it is hopelessly outdated and that it contains no word about diplomacy. | False |
“Why didn't you ask the National Assembly, why didn't you listen to the people's representatives, but signed an agreement which, by the way, was written two years before you went to Kyiv, and this agreement is even hopelessly outdated. There isn't even a word about diplomacy in it.” False
The draft is indeed older. The Council of Ministers approved it as a basis for negotiations with Decision No. 682 of 4 November 2024, as Kiselova cited in parliament on 19 December 2024. That is about 17 months before the signing, so “two years” is roughly true. The signed text, however, is not outdated. It was supplemented and cites documents from 2025 and 2026: a Council of Europe resolution of 9 July 2025, the Hague Convention of 16 December 2025, the joint statement on gas of 24 February 2026, the Coalition of the Willing. The claim “no word about diplomacy” is refuted by the text itself. Bulgaria will support Ukraine in all dimensions: “political, financial, military, humanitarian and diplomatic”. There is a separate section, “Just and lasting peace”, in which the parties will work towards a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace”. There is also cooperation on public diplomacy. The only true part is that the text does not provide for negotiations with Russia: peace is “on terms defined by Ukraine”. Sources
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| 0:39:57 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the BOTAS contract became necessary because Kiril Petkov and Asen Vassilev cut off Russian gas supplies “overnight”, which required a quick decision by the caretaker cabinet. | False |
“BOTAS happened because Mr Kiril Petkov and Mr Asen Vassilev cut off Russian gas supplies to Bulgaria overnight. [...] And this had to be a very rapid decision by the caretaker government.” False
Supplies were stopped by Gazprom Export. On 26 April 2022 it notified Bulgargaz that it would stop supplies from 07:00 on 27 April, because the Bulgarian side had not accepted the new rouble payment scheme under Putin's decree. Bulgargaz describes the stoppage as unilateral, with its obligations for April fulfilled (Bulgargaz, 2 May 2022). European Commission President von der Leyen called it an attempt at blackmail on 27 April 2022 (European Commission). In July 2024 Bulgargaz brought arbitration proceedings against Gazprom Export in Paris for over 400 million euros in damages for the “unilateral suspension” of supplies (Bulgargaz, 9 July 2024). The Petkov government refused the rouble scheme, but the cut-off was Gazprom's decision. The link with BOTAS is also not confirmed by the official source. The contract was signed on 3 January 2023, eight months after the stoppage. The Ministry of Energy links it to security of supply after the war in Ukraine and to the Radev–Erdoğan meeting three weeks earlier, not to an emergency (Ministry of Energy, 3 January 2023). Sources
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| 0:40:36 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that under the BOTAS contract Bulgaria owes nearly 400 million, which will drive Bulgargaz into bankruptcy. | Mostly true |
“What we see is nearly 400 million dollars that we owe and that will drive Bulgargaz into bankruptcy.” Mostly true
The latest official figures are slightly under 400 million. On 7 July 2026 Prime Minister Radev stated that the accumulated debt to BOTAS is 360 million dollars, as nothing has been paid since July 2024 (Economic.bg, 7 July 2026). On 12 July Minister Iva Petrova spoke of about 360 million euros (Fakti, 12 July 2026). As of 30 September 2025 the Council of Ministers cited over 600 million leva (gov.bg). “Nearly 400 million” rounds up slightly. According to Minister Petrova, no interest accrues on the accumulated liabilities during the renegotiation, and a mechanism will be sought to settle them “without burdening the budget”. Exactly how this will be done is not public. The financial pressure on Bulgargaz is real. Its loss for 2025 is 267.2 million leva, almost entirely from unused capacity under BOTAS (250.4 million leva). The auditor gave a qualified opinion because it considers the contract onerous (Frognews). “Will drive into bankruptcy”, however, is a forecast. There is no official insolvency document, and the freeze stops new debt from accumulating. Sources
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| 0:40:43 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that gas supplies in 2022 were stopped not by the Bulgarian government but by Gazprom, unilaterally. | True |
“Now, it wasn't the Bulgarian government that stopped the gas supplies, it was Gazprom that unilaterally stopped the gas supplies and wanted to leave all of Bulgaria in the dark and in the cold, but the government at the time acted quickly and had secured liquefied gas that could be delivered.” True
On 26 April 2022 Gazprom Export notified Bulgargaz that it would stop supplies from 07:00 on 27 April because Bulgaria had not accepted payment under the new rouble scheme. Bulgargaz states that its obligations for April were fulfilled and describes the termination as unilateral (Bulgargaz, 2 May 2022). The European Commission also speaks of a unilateral cut-off (European Commission, 27 April 2022). Context: the Bulgarian side's decision was to refuse the rouble scheme, which contradicted the contract in force until the end of 2022. Stopping the gas was Gazprom's decision, for which Bulgargaz is seeking over 400 million euros in compensation in arbitration (Bulgargaz, 9 July 2024). The part about “in the dark and in the cold” is a judgement about intent and is not checked. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Г34) | |||
| 0:41:02 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the Petkov government quickly secured liquefied gas and that six ships were then turned down “so that expensive gas could be bought later”. | Mostly true |
“there were 6 ships that were turned down, so that expensive gas could be bought later.” Mostly true
On 28 July 2022 Minister Aleksandar Nikolov of the Petkov cabinet announced a contract for 7 LNG tankers from a US supplier (Cheniere): 3 by the end of 2022 and 4 in 2023, at a price about 30 dollars/MWh below the European average. Capacity at the Greek Revithoussa terminal was booked only for the first cargo, in October (Ministry of Energy, 28 July 2022). The offer had to be confirmed by 19 August, by then by the next government. On 19 August 2022 caretaker minister Rosen Hristov (Donev cabinet) accepted one cargo for October and declined two for November and December. As the reason he cited the fact that unloading slots at competitive prices had not been arranged. The option for four more tankers in 2023 lapsed (Ministry of Energy, 19 August 2022). Six of the seven ships were indeed not taken. Cheniere refused to extend the deadline (LNG Prime). The inaccuracy lies in two points. “Secured” is strong: there was a binding offer, but without slots arranged for most of the deliveries. And “so that expensive gas could be bought later” attributes an intent that the documents do not show. The official reason is the expensive slots, and how much more expensive the later purchases were is not checked here. Sources
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| 0:41:11 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the agreement was in parliament and that the Speaker of the National Assembly returned it to the government, arguing that signing it is the cabinet's prerogative. | Mostly true |
“Let's just say that it was in the National Assembly, and then the Speaker of the National Assembly sends it back to the government and says that the power to sign this agreement lies with the government.” Mostly true
The transcript of 19 December 2024 shows that the then caretaker prime minister Glavchev asked parliament for a mandate to sign the agreement. DPS-New Beginning tabled a draft decision to that effect. Speaker Natalia Kiselova refused to put it to a vote. Her reasoning was that concluding the agreement is “within the competence of the government under Art. 105(1) of the Constitution”. She added that Council of Ministers Decision No. 682 of 4 November 2024 already authorised the prime minister to sign and that he should comply with it instead of shifting responsibility to parliament. The substance of the claim is true. Formally, Kiselova did not “return” a document but refused to table a draft decision on a mandate, and this was her position, not a decision of parliament. The text signed in 2026 is also not quite the same: it cites documents from 2025 and 2026 (e.g. the joint statement of 24 February 2026 and the Hague Convention of 16 December 2025), i.e. it was supplemented. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Г37 Потвърдено | |||
| 0:41:30 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the agreement contains not a single provision with an undertaken commitment, that it is a framework agreement and that every contract under it is subject to ratification by the National Assembly. | Misleading |
“that this agreement contains commitments, point to one provision that contains a commitment. This is a framework agreement, on the basis of which contracts can be signed, and every one of those contracts is subject to ratification by the National Assembly.” Misleading
It is true that the agreement is not a legally binding treaty. Its final provisions state that it does not fall within the scope of the Vienna Convention and “provides for political commitments”. It can be terminated by written notice with a six-month period. On 3 July 2026 Prime Minister Radev also said in parliament that Bulgaria “has not undertaken any specific commitment”. It is false that the text contains no commitment. The document speaks of “undertaking long-term bilateral commitments”. It repeatedly says “Bulgaria commits”: to contribute to the development of Ukraine's security and defence forces, to support Ukraine's recovery, to create conditions for transport routes. The parties “reaffirm their commitment” to the Coalition of the Willing and will take steps to finalise the sale of the equipment for Belene. These are political, not legal, commitments, but they are commitments. The text does not say that contracts under it are subject to ratification. It provides that “the authorised institutions” may conclude implementing and technical arrangements. Ratification is required only for the treaties listed in Art. 85(1) of the Constitution (of a political or military nature, with financial obligations, etc.). Some future contracts may fall into that category, but “every one” is an exaggeration. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Г38 Опровергано: текстът говори за „дългосрочни двустранни ангажименти“ и не казва нищо за ратификация | |||
| 0:41:52 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that nowhere does the agreement provide for Bulgarian soldiers to go to Ukraine, and that it provides for Bulgarian companies to take part in Ukraine's reconstruction after peace. | Mostly true |
“Let's just say that nowhere in this agreement is it envisaged that Bulgarian soldiers go to Ukraine. What is envisaged is that Bulgarian companies can take part in the reconstruction of Ukraine once peace is imposed.” Mostly true
The first part is true. The full text contains no provision for sending Bulgarian troops to Ukraine. Military cooperation consists of training Ukrainian personnel in Bulgaria and through EU and NATO mechanisms, exercises, and supplies according to capabilities and “in accordance with the applicable decisions of the National Assembly”. The second part also has support. Section 3, “Recovery and reconstruction”, provides for business partnerships and for encouraging “the relevant private sectors” in the recovery. Bulgaria commits to supporting specific projects in energy, construction, water, digitalisation and other areas, and to making “a positive contribution to the process of post-war recovery”. Two things are left out. First, the agreement reaffirms a political commitment to the activities of the Coalition of the Willing, and one of them is the multinational force after a ceasefire. Second, support for recovery is not tied only to the period “after peace” but to the ongoing recovery. Bulgarian companies are not named explicitly. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Г39 и Г40 Потвърдено | |||
| 0:43:22 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that, as part of NATO, there are currently allied troops in Bulgaria. | True |
“And fortunately for us, we are currently part of the strongest defensive alliance in the world. And that also includes the presence of allied troops,” True
NATO's multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria remains deployed. The framework nation is Italy, and Albania, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Turkey and the US take part (composition as of June 2026, page updated on 29 September 2026) (NATO). The forces rotate. The last rotation of the Bulgarian contingent at the Novo Selo training area was in July 2026. Sources
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| 0:43:40 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the allied forces rotate and that until recently there was a multinational brigade in Bulgaria, which fulfilled its commitments and left under a pre-set NATO programme. | Misleading |
“Usually they rotate. So until very recently there was such a multinational brigade here. It fulfilled its commitments, and this is according to the pre-set programme of our NATO partners.” Misleading
The rotational principle is correct (NATO). The allied presence, however, has not ended. The multinational battlegroup with Italy as framework nation is still in Bulgaria. It is at battlegroup level, not brigade level. NATO says only that allies are exercising the ability to reinforce it to a brigade, and does not report any brigade leaving. The only known brigade-level withdrawal is a US national decision of October 2025. At that time the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, with units in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, went home without being replaced (France 24, 29 October 2025). This is an American, not a multinational, brigade. The decision was Washington's, which notified NATO in advance, and was not part of an Alliance programme. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й58): НАТО не говори за напуснала бригада | |||
| 0:44:14 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Bulgarian soldiers will not go to Ukraine because there are two decisions of the National Assembly against it, and that a new declaration has been tabled that also covers peacekeeping forces. | Mostly true |
“that Bulgarian soldiers will never go to Ukraine, because there are decisions taken by the National Assembly, and any speculation on this topic is outright lies.” Mostly true
In parliament's registers we found one such act. The declaration of the 51st National Assembly of 21 February 2025 (State Gazette, issue 16/2025) expresses its position “on the non-participation of Bulgarian armed forces in military operations on the territory of Ukraine”. The title of its draft includes the qualification “outside allied commitments” in NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE. We did not find a second decision on the same subject. This is a declaration, i.e. a political position, not a legal prohibition. The new declaration exists. On 28 October 2026 a draft was tabled (ref. 52-654-03-4), according to Club Z by Democratic Bulgaria. It is “on the non-participation of Bulgarian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine”, without the restriction “in military operations”, i.e. it covers any presence, as Gyurov says. As of the day of the debate it had not been voted on. The real guarantee is in the Constitution: only the National Assembly can authorise sending armed forces outside the country (Art. 84(11)). “Never” is a promise and is not assessed. Sources
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| 0:44:37 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Gyurov signed the agreement secretly, committing Bulgaria to the Coalition of the Willing, whose current activity is training soldiers as peacekeeping forces for after the peace. | Misleading |
“you undertake the commitment for our participation in the Coalition of the Willing. At the moment the subject of activity of the Coalition of the Willing, if you don't know this either, is training soldiers from the countries in this coalition as peacekeeping forces after the peace in Ukraine.” Misleading
The signing was not secret. It was announced at a joint press conference with Zelensky on 30 March 2026 and in a government announcement the same day. The full text was published by the Council of Ministers on 31 March. It is true that parliament was not informed in advance, as MPs said on 1 April. Yotova at the time described the move as a breach of dialogue between institutions (bTV). The commitment to the coalition is indeed written in the text, but only as a political declaration (see the check of p1-64). The description of the coalition's current activity is partial. The statement of 13 July 2026 says that the Multinational Force Ukraine is “ready to act” after a credible ceasefire and that exercises will be held in the coming months. The same statement, however, also speaks of air defence, long-range capabilities, sanctions and the “shadow fleet”. This force is not described as peacekeeping on the UN model, but as a force for regenerating the Ukrainian army and providing reassurance to Ukraine. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й59 Недоказано (обявено на 30.03; дали президентът и НС са знаели предварително, не е ясно); Й60 Недоказано | |||
| 0:45:41 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the parties that nominated and support Gyurov voted for Bulgaria to take part in the Coalition of the Willing. | False |
“As for Progressive Bulgaria, I'm sure they will support such a declaration, but I'm not sure about the parties that nominated you and support you, Mr Gyurov, because they voted for Bulgaria to take part in the coalition of the willing, which is currently busy preparing soldiers to enter Ukraine after the peace.” False
There was no vote on participation in the coalition. In reply to a parliamentary question, Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova-Chamova said that there is no act of either the Council of Ministers or the National Assembly by which Bulgaria became part of the coalition. The format is informal, without membership (BNT, 31 July 2026). We also found no such vote in parliament's registers. Bulgaria joined the coalition's work in 2025, under the government of Rosen Zhelyazkov. The prime minister described Bulgaria's contribution in October 2025. That government also included the BSP, which now supports Yotova. PP-DB were in opposition. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й61 Непроверимо (акт или гласуване не е намерено) | |||
| 0:46:10 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Bulgaria's participation in the Coalition of the Willing opens the door for Bulgarian companies to take part in Ukraine's reconstruction. | Misleading |
“Because this opens the door to the participation of Bulgarian companies in the reconstruction of Ukraine.” Misleading
The coalition's documents do not link participation with reconstruction. The Paris Declaration is about security guarantees. The statement of 13 July 2026 is about military aid, air defence and sanctions. Neither document contains a mechanism for reconstruction or procurement. The provisions on private-sector participation in recovery, which Gyurov also referred to earlier in the debate, are in the bilateral agreement with Ukraine (section 3), not in the coalition. The link he makes may be indirect and political, but it is not supported in any public document. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Г47 Непроверимо (причинно-следствена оценка) | |||
| 0:46:18 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the coalition's document says nothing about Ukraine's reconstruction and that its only subject of activity is preparing peacekeeping forces. | Misleading |
“There is no such thing in this document. I want to say this to our viewers. The only subject of activity is precisely the preparation of the peacekeeping forces.” Misleading
If “the document” is the coalition's declaration, the first part is true. The Paris Declaration of 6 January 2026 does not speak of reconstruction. The economic part of the statement of 13 July 2026 is about sanctions and frozen Russian assets. “The only subject of activity”, however, is false. The Paris Declaration describes five strands: participation in a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, long-term support for the Ukrainian army, a multinational force for Ukraine, binding commitments in the event of a new attack, and defence cooperation, including joint production. The July statement adds air defence, long-range capabilities and measures against the “shadow fleet”. The multinational force is only one of these strands. If “the document” is the Kyiv agreement, the claim is false in its first part too: it has a separate section, “Recovery and reconstruction”. Sources
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| 0:46:29 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the peacekeeping forces are being prepared at a French fort, which she names as “Saint-Valérien”. | Mostly true |
“I'll even remember now the name of the French fort where this is happening. I think, if I'm not mistaken, it was Saint-Valérien.” Mostly true
The headquarters of the Multinational Force Ukraine is at Fort Mont-Valérien, west of Paris. Macron and Zelensky visited it on 17 November 2025 (Euronews). The Paris Declaration speaks of an operational headquarters of the coalition in Paris. In July 2026 Yotova herself named it correctly, “Fort Mont-Valérien” (News.bg). The name is slightly wrong, and she herself adds “if I'm not mistaken”. More importantly, it is the planning and command headquarters, not a place where soldiers are trained. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й64 Недоказано (gov.uk говори за щаб в Париж, не за форт) | |||
| 0:46:35 | Yotova | Yotova claims that far-sighted Bulgarian military officers and politicians prevented the sending of Bulgarian service members even in the coalition's current preparations. | Unverifiable |
“But thank God there are far-sighted Bulgarian military people and politicians who prevented the sending, even now, in the preparation of Bulgarian capabilities.” Unverifiable
We found no public document showing that there was a plan to second Bulgarian military personnel to the headquarters or exercises of the multinational force and that it was stopped. What is documented is something else: decisions that Bulgaria would not provide soldiers. In October 2025 Prime Minister Zhelyazkov defined the contribution as ships and infrastructure, with no troops in the conflict zone. In July 2026 Yotova herself said that the government at the time had decided that Bulgaria would not join the multinational corps (News.bg). On 14 July 2026 Radev declined participation in the coalition. Defence Minister Stoyanov said the same day that Bulgaria “has not signed any documents” (Novinite.bg/BTA). These decisions do not prove that anyone “prevented” a specific deployment. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Й65 Недоказано | |||
| 0:46:45 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the result of the actions of the statesmen Yotova praises is Bulgaria's exit from the Coalition of the Willing and its isolation. | Mostly true |
“What these statesmen thwarted: Bulgaria's exit from the coalition of the willing, putting Bulgaria in isolation and cutting off the opportunity for Bulgarian industry to develop” Mostly true
On 14 July 2026 in Paris, Prime Minister Radev declined Macron's invitation and stated: “We are not taking part in a coalition that insists on continued financial and military aid for Ukraine” (gov.bg). The next day the government confirmed its decision that Bulgaria would not take part in the coalition's consultations. Before that, Bulgaria did take part: the Zhelyazkov government set out a contribution in 2025, and Gyurov took part in the coalition's video conference on 24 February 2026 (Novinite). In this sense Bulgaria really is leaving the coalition. There is no formal withdrawal, however, because, in the foreign minister's words, there was no formal membership. “Isolation” and “cutting off opportunities for industry” are judgements and are not checked. The decision is that of the Radev cabinet, which Yotova supports. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Г48 Недоказано (МС потвърждава неучастие, но не и че това са „държавниците“ на Йотова) | |||
| 0:47:52 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the Ruse–Bucharest railway line will be closed from April and the western line through Kalotina from January. | Mostly true |
“The railway routes north to Bucharest, from Ruse to Bucharest, the line will be closed from April, and to the west, through Kalotina, it will be closed from January.” Mostly true
On 28 August 2026 the Ministry of Transport and Communications announced that in Romania a full suspension of traffic on the Giurgiu Nord – Ruse route is planned from April to December 2027. The Ruse part is true (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 28 August 2026). For the western direction, the same announcement says that Serbia plans to close the Niš – Dimitrovgrad section (the continuation of the line through Kalotina) for about 200 days, from September 2026, not from January. A later media report, citing E-80 NEWS, points to an expected closure from January 2027 (Blitz, 5 September 2026). We found no official confirmation of January. These are temporary closures for repairs (about 200 days in Serbia, 9 months in Romania), not a permanent cut. Minister Georgi Peev has proposed advance timetable slots for freight trains to avoid a complete interruption. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Русе: Потвърдено (Г51); Калотина от януари: Недоказано (Г52), МТС сочи септември 2026 | |||
| 0:48:12 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that four out of every ten Bulgarian citizens are employed in manufacturing, trade and transport. | Mostly true |
“Four out of every 10 Bulgarian citizens are employed in manufacturing, trade and transport.” Mostly true
According to NSI data cited by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, in 2025 there were 2,930.1 thousand employed persons aged 15 and over. Of these, 515.1 thousand were in “Trade; repair of motor vehicles”, 470.9 thousand in “Manufacturing” and 191.8 thousand in “Transport, storage and post” (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, brief analysis 2025). In total that is 1,177.8 thousand people, or 40.2% of the employed. The share of “four in ten” is accurate, but for the employed, not for “citizens”: of the whole population it is under one fifth. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г53): 4 от 10 заети, не граждани | |||
| 0:49:48 | Yotova | Yotova claims that as prime minister Kiril Petkov was going to betray the position on North Macedonia, that he set off “one Monday” to Skopje to change it, and that an urgent consultative meeting with Radev then prevented this. | Misleading |
“But I want to remind you of something else too. It's good that this discussion came up, because when Mr Kiril Petkov was prime minister, I can quite calmly tell our Bulgarian citizens that the Bulgarian position was literally saved at the eleventh hour, because he was going to betray the Bulgarian position. And then, I'll just remind you, there was an extremely urgent meeting, a consultative one, with the then president Mr Rumen Radev, which prevented this possibility.” Misleading
There is a real event at the root of this. Radev convened the Consultative Council for National Security on 10 January 2022, a week before Petkov's visit to Skopje on 18 January. The council's opinion requires that consent to negotiations not be tied “to deadlines” but to real results, including on the rights of Macedonian Bulgarians (president.bg, 11 January 2022). Until then Petkov had spoken publicly of a new process with a short deadline of about six months. On 1 February Radev said that the visit had been “too early” (BNT, 1 February 2022). The chronology in the debate, however, is reversed. The council was convened before the trip, not after Petkov “had set off”. The trip was on a Tuesday, 18 January. The position was not changed: the blockade continued until parliament's decision of 24 June 2022. The claim that Petkov “was going to betray” the position is a judgement about intentions that the documents do not confirm. In the same exchange Yotova says that Petkov was “with me in Skopje”. The presidency's publication from that period shows her in Bitola on 16 April 2022, not in Skopje (president.bg, 16 April 2022). That publication does not mention Petkov being present. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Й70, Й76); Недоказано (Й78): в Битоля, не в СкопиеSega (not a fact-check): Петков съди Йотова; казва, че общото пътуване е било до Битоля | |||
| 0:50:27 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the presidency was the first to raise the issue of the rights of Bulgarians in North Macedonia, which is missing even from the good-neighbourliness treaty. | Mostly true |
“Incidentally, it was precisely the presidency that for the first time put on the table the issue of the rights of Bulgarians in the RNM, because this issue is missing even from the good-neighbourliness treaty between the two countries.” Mostly true
The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation of 1 August 2017, ratified in 2018, contains no provision on the rights of Bulgarians in North Macedonia as a community (State Gazette, issue 9/2018). Art. 11 contains only a general right of each party to protect “the rights and interests of its citizens” on the territory of the other, and a commitment against hate propaganda. In this respect Yotova is right. Whether the presidency was “first” cannot be fully proven. The presidency's own publication states that the framework position of October 2019 was drawn up after a consultative meeting with the president in September 2019 (president.bg, Consultative Council for National Security, 10 January 2022). The decisions, however, were adopted by the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly. Whether the issue had been raised by other institutions before that has not been checked. Sources
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| 0:50:44 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that at the time of the French proposal he was chair of the parliamentary group and the sponsor of the decision in the National Assembly. | Misleading |
“I was then chair of the parliamentary group, I was the sponsor of this agreement in the National Assembly” Misleading
The first part is true. His parliamentary profile lists him as chair of the We Continue the Change parliamentary group from 3 December 2021 to 1 August 2022 (parliament.bg). The second part is false. On 24 June 2022 three draft decisions were debated. Their sponsors were Mustafa Karadayi and a group of MPs (DPS), Desislava Atanasova and a group of MPs (GERB-SDS), and Hristo Ivanov (DB). Hristo Ivanov's draft was adopted with amendments, with 170 votes in favour (National Assembly transcript, 24 June 2022). Gyurov was not a sponsor of any of them, and they do not appear in the list of acts he tabled. His group supported the decision, and he himself took part in the debate with a rejoinder. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Г56): вносители са Карадайъ, Атанасова и Хр. Иванов | |||
| 0:50:51 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the presidency's position on the French proposal changed before and after its adoption. | Mostly true |
“and it is especially interesting to trace how the position of the presidency changes before and after the adoption of the French agreement.” Mostly true
The presidency's position changed several times within days. Around 19 June 2022 Radev insisted that the veto be kept. On 21 June he called the French proposal “the best” so far (Radio Free Europe, 21 June 2022). On 25 June, the day after the vote in parliament, he criticised MPs for giving a “blank cheque” (Radio Free Europe, 25 June 2022). In the debate Yotova now defends what was agreed and says that she “will not give up a single centimetre” of it. Only one line remains consistent: for years Radev has insisted that Bulgarians be written into North Macedonia's constitution. The changes concern the assessment of the proposal, not this core demand. Sources
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| 0:52:55 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that PP insisted that Bulgaria's positions be included in the agreement and thus become a European position, under which Bulgarians must be written into North Macedonia's constitution. | True |
“We insisted on Bulgaria's positions being included in the agreement, so that it would become a European position. And that is why the European position now is that Bulgarians must be included in the Constitution,” True
The National Assembly's decision of 24 June 2022 explicitly sets the condition of guaranteeing the rights of Bulgarians, “including through their inclusion on an equal footing with other peoples in the Constitution” of North Macedonia. PP voted for it (National Assembly transcript, 24 June 2022). The Council of the EU conclusions of 18 July 2022 welcome North Macedonia's intention to make a priority of the constitutional changes to include citizens who are part of other peoples, “such as Bulgarians”. They tie the second intergovernmental conference to the implementation of these changes (Council of the EU, 11440/22). So the condition did indeed become part of the European position. Sources
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| 0:55:43 | Yotova | Yotova claims that half of the people in the “house book” were not eligible because of Bulgarian and European legislation, so her choice was limited. | Mostly true |
“I didn't have, well, much of a choice, because the so-called “house book” of the caretaker cabinet, with the proposals, half of them were not suitable because of national and European legislation.” Mostly true
In January–February 2026 the list under Article 99(5) of the Constitution (as amended in 2023) contains ten people: the Speaker of the National Assembly, the BNB governor and three deputy governors, the president and two vice-presidents of the Court of Audit, the Ombudsman and her deputy. Five decline (Raya Nazaryan, Dimitar Radev, Petar Chobanov, Radoslav Milenkov, Velislava Delcheva) and five accept (Gyurov, Glavchev, Nikolova, Kadreva, Filipova), according to Radio Free Europe. The figure of “half” matches. Some of the refusals do indeed cite the law. BNB Governor Radev states that accepting would violate “both Bulgarian and European legislation” (BNT, 28 January 2026). On 12 February 2026 Yotova herself lists three groups of reasons for the refusals: conflict of interest, incompatibility of offices and incompatibility with Bulgarian and European legislation (president.bg). What is missing: at the time she did not say how many of the refusals were on legal grounds, and for some of those who declined (Nazaryan, Delcheva) no reason was given publicly. The refusals were made by the officials themselves; they were not automatically ruled out. And the choice was not zero: five accepted. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й79): на 12.02.2026 изброява причините, но без брой | |||
| 0:56:13 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the “house book” also includes people appointed by the presidential institution. | False |
“In fact, there are also people there who were appointed by the presidential institution” False
Article 99(5) of the Constitution lists the offices from which a caretaker prime minister is chosen: the Speaker of the National Assembly, the governor or a deputy governor of the BNB, the president or a vice-president of the Court of Audit, and the Ombudsman or a deputy Ombudsman (the Constitution). All these offices are filled by election by the National Assembly. For the BNB, the bank explicitly states that the governor and the three deputy governors are elected by the National Assembly (BNB). The President does indeed appoint three members of the BNB Governing Council, but they are not deputy governors and are not on the caretaker PM list. On 12 February 2026 Yotova herself stressed that “every candidate for potential caretaker prime minister has been elected by the political majority in the National Assembly” (president.bg). Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г63) | |||
| 0:59:19 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the BOTAS contract was a decision of a caretaker government. | Mostly true |
“As for your remark about BOTAS, Mr Gyurov? That was a decision of a caretaker government” Mostly true
Formally this is true. The agreement was signed by Bulgargaz on 3 January 2023 at the Council of Ministers, under the Donev caretaker cabinet and energy minister Rosen Hristov (Ministry of Energy, 3 January 2023). What is left out is that the caretaker cabinet was appointed by President Radev. According to Minister Hristov himself, the contract was signed “literally three weeks” after Radev and Erdoğan agreed on broad cooperation. Yotova herself linked it to the Radev–Erdoğan meeting in February 2023 (BTA, 2 February 2023). Presenting it as a decision of the caretaker government alone separates the contract from the presidency, to which she then belonged as vice president. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Свързаното твърдение, че споразумението с Украйна е „не по-малко обвързващо“ от „Боташ“: Невярно (№12) | |||
| 0:59:27 | Yotova | Yotova claims that by signing the agreement in Kyiv Gyurov acted in the same way as with the BOTAS contract and that the agreement is no less binding. | False |
“and you acted in exactly the same way, if you think that this is true, when you signed the agreement in Kyiv for Ukraine. In the same way, no less binding.” False
The two documents are of a different legal nature. The Bulgargaz–BOTAS agreement is a 13-year commercial contract signed on 3 January 2023. It produces real payments: on 30 September 2025 Prime Minister Zhelyazkov said that the contract had already left Bulgargaz with liabilities of over 600 million leva. The agreement with Ukraine is explicitly outside the Vienna Convention, “provides for political commitments”, contains no financial obligations and can be terminated with six months' notice. Prime Minister Radev, whom Yotova supports, said in parliament on 3 July 2026 that under it Bulgaria “has not undertaken any specific commitment”. What the two documents have in common is that they are long-term and were signed by caretaker governments. In terms of how binding they are, however, they are not comparable. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: НЕВЯРНО (№12): различна правна природа, търговски договор срещу политически ангажименти | |||
| 1:00:20 | Yotova | Yotova says that the Gyurov caretaker cabinet governed for “70-something days” and that under the “house book” nobody bears responsibility for it. | True |
“At one point nobody, according to this “house book”, wanted to take responsibility for it. Neither me nor the National Assembly. Everyone says, they're a set of people, let them sort things out for those 70-odd, whatever Mr Gyurov told us.” True
The caretaker government was appointed by Decree No. 57 of 19 February 2026, and its powers were terminated by a decision of the National Assembly on 8 May 2026 upon the election of the new cabinet (transcript, 8 May 2026). That makes 78 days, i.e. “70-something”. The second part (“nobody takes responsibility”) is a political assessment and is not rated. The constitutional framework is that the caretaker prime minister proposes the line-up and the President appoints it. On 19–20 February 2026 Yotova herself stated that the cabinet “is not my choice” and that it must report to the National Assembly (president.bg). Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Й81), за частта за отговорността | |||
| 1:00:48 | Yotova | Yotova claims that during Gyurov's government prices rose the most and inflation jumped the most. | Mostly true |
“Yes, you handled the elections, and I am a fair and honest enough person. I said so right after the elections were held. From here on the big “but” begins. Because during your government prices rose the most, during your government inflation jumped the most, and you turned out to be incapable of dealing with it.” Mostly true
The Gyurov caretaker cabinet was in office from 19 February to 8 May 2026 (78 days). According to NSI data, monthly CPI inflation in 2026 was: January 0.6%, February 0.4%, March 0.9%, April 1.8%, May 0.0%, June −0.9%, July 0.8%, August 0.6%, September −0.2%. The two highest months of the year, March and April, fall entirely within the caretaker cabinet's term. Annual CPI inflation jumped from 3.3% in February to 6.8% in April and 6.9% in May, then fell to 4.5% in July and 5.7% in September. The HICP picture is the same: monthly 1.0% in March and 1.8% in April, and an annual peak of 6.0% in April and 6.3% in May. Arithmetically, the claim is true on both measures, monthly and annual. The annual peak in May, however, comes mainly from what accumulated in March and April, and Gyurov governed only the first 8 days of May. The context of the cause is missing. The jump began with the war in the Middle East from 28 February: according to EIA data, Brent crude rose from about 71 dollars a barrel at the end of February to 124 dollars in early April. In April the NSI recorded monthly increases of 9.0% in transport, 19.5% for diesel and 26.3% for LPG. The shock was Europe-wide: according to Eurostat, monthly euro area inflation was 1.3% in March and 1.0% in April, also the highest values of the year. “Prices rose the most” is a fact; the data do not show that the cause was the caretaker cabinet's governance. Sources
Other fact-checks | |||
| 1:00:48 | Yotova | Yotova says that immediately after the elections she publicly acknowledged that the Gyurov cabinet had handled the elections well. | True |
“Yes, you handled the elections, and I am a sufficiently fair, honest person. I said so right after the elections were held.” True
In her address at the opening of the 52nd National Assembly on 30 April 2026, 11 days after the elections of 19 April, Yotova says: “The caretaker government coped. It did a lot to stop vote-buying in the elections” (transcript, 30 April 2026). The assessment was made in the paragraph on the elections, which matches her words in the debate: praise for the elections, criticism for everything else. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й82): казва го на 30.04, 11 дни след изборите | |||
| 1:01:36 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Gyurov set up a price stability task force that worked for only a month, when the cabinet was already on its way out. | Mostly true |
“You set up a task force for price stability. You did it for one month, when you were already leaving office.” Mostly true
By Decision No. 257 of 2 April 2026, the Council of Ministers set up a Crisis Task Force for coordinating the monitoring and control of prices of goods and fuels, headed by the prime minister. The task force meets once a week. The government announced its intention as early as 27 March, when it adopted a package of nearly 100 million euros. The cabinet was replaced on 8 May, so the task force operated for about five weeks. This roughly corresponds to “one month”. “When you were already leaving” is an exaggeration. 2 April is shortly after the midpoint of the 78-day term and 17 days before the elections of 19 April. Nor was the task force the cabinet's first response. As early as 20 March the 20-euro compensation programme was adopted (Decision No. 229), and before that the prime minister had set up by order an interagency working group on fuels, mentioned in Decision No. 257. It is true, however, that the task force appeared about five weeks after the start of the price shock at the end of February. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Й86) | |||
| 1:02:06 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Yotova stated in the National Assembly that the caretaker cabinet had been successful. | Mostly true |
“For the assessment of the caretaker government, I rely precisely on the opinion of other people, both Mrs Yotova, who stated in the National Assembly that this was a successful cabinet, and the thousands of Bulgarian citizens we met during the campaign.” Mostly true
On 30 April 2026, in the National Assembly, Yotova says: “The caretaker government coped. It did a lot to stop vote-buying in the elections” (transcript). There was a positive assessment from the parliamentary rostrum. However, she does not call the cabinet “successful” in general. The praise is for running the elections, in a paragraph about the elections. In the debate Yotova herself separates the elections from prices and inflation, over which she criticises the cabinet. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г66): „се справи“, в абзаца за изборите, без да го нарича успешен | |||
| 1:02:22 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the agreement with Ukraine contains not a single binding sentence and that Yotova is manipulating by calling it binding. | Mostly true |
“But now, regarding the binding part, right away, Mrs Yotova, you are manipulating Bulgarian citizens by saying that the agreement is binding. There is not a single binding sentence in this agreement, unlike BOTAS, where we pay 500 thousand euros, half a million, every day.” Mostly true
In the legal sense this is true. The last section of the agreement says that it is not a treaty under the Vienna Convention and provides for political commitments. The Council of Ministers explains that it contains no legally binding obligations. Implementation is “within their capabilities” and in accordance with national legislation. The document can be terminated unilaterally with six months' notice. What is left out is that the document describes itself as undertaking political commitments for 10 years. The Radev government stated in parliament on 3 July 2026 that it is “implementing the agreement”, i.e. the agreement has real political effect. So “nothing binding” is true of legal obligations, but not of political ones. Sources
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| 1:02:56 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that under the caretaker cabinet prices rose most slowly for the year, and that there is now an acceleration. | False |
“Regarding prices and inflation, please check your data. It was precisely during the caretaker cabinet that prices rose most slowly this year.” False
NSI data show the opposite. On the CPI, monthly inflation was highest in March (0.9%) and April (1.8%), entirely under the caretaker cabinet (19 February–8 May 2026). The lowest months were June (−0.9%) and September (−0.2%), under the Radev government. Annual inflation was also highest under the caretaker cabinet: 6.8% in April and 6.9% in May, against 4.5–5.7% in July–September. Eurostat gives the same picture on the HICP: annually 6.0% in April and 6.3% in May, 4.4–5.6% in July–September. The only true part is the second sentence. After the summer, annual inflation accelerated again: on the CPI from 4.5% in July to 5.7% in September, on the HICP from 4.4% to 5.6%. But even with this acceleration it remains below the April–May peak. Neither the monthly nor the annual measure, nor the HICP, supports the claim that prices rose “most slowly” under the caretaker cabinet. The lowest annual value of the year was in February (3.3% CPI, 2.1% HICP), but that month falls almost entirely before the cabinet took office on 19 February. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Невярноzakogo.com: Опровергано (Г68); ускорението след кабинета: Недоказано (Г69) | |||
| 1:03:07 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that his price task force developed a “traffic light” mechanism with different measures depending on how the crisis developed and left it to the Radev cabinet. | Mostly true |
“Now there's been an acceleration. And the price task force that we set up, we didn't just set up a task force, we didn't just talk to all the institutions and economic sectors involved, but we also made a mechanism based on a traffic light, which showed different actions and mechanisms depending on how the crisis developed. And this mechanism was left behind. You only needed Mr Radev to apply it, to give predictability and help to Bulgarian citizens.” Mostly true
On 27 March 2026 the Council of Ministers described its measures as “planned in stages”, so that a response would be ready at “different levels of development of the crisis”, and announced that the task force would control when each measure was triggered. Some measures have an automatic threshold. The 20-euro compensation kicks in when the average price of A95 petrol or diesel exceeds 1.60 euros per litre for three consecutive days. The electricity compensation for businesses is calculated monthly when the market price is above about 122 euros/MWh. So a staged mechanism with thresholds did exist. We found no official document that calls the mechanism a “traffic light” or describes colour levels. Nor do we have a document showing exactly what was handed over to the next government. Gyurov handed Radev reports on the state of government on 8 May, but their content is not public. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Г70) | |||
| 1:03:37 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Radev did not adopt the caretaker cabinet's mechanism because it produced no results. | Unverifiable |
“Mr Radev did not adopt this mechanism, because it produced no results at all” Unverifiable
We found no decision or statement by the Radev government that abolishes the task force under Decision No. 257 or assesses the caretaker cabinet's mechanism. The Radev cabinet pursues its own policy. In June it announced the “Basket of Care” initiative with retail chains. In September it replaced the monthly electricity compensation for businesses with a one-off payment after 30 June 2027. The 20-euro programme, part of the caretaker cabinet's measures, was adopted with a deadline of 30 June 2026. There is evidence of payments in May too, under the new government. Whether Radev explicitly “rejected” the mechanism, and for what reason, is not publicly documented. “Produced no results at all” is a judgement, not a verifiable fact. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Непроверимо (Й87) | |||
| 1:04:55 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that under the caretaker cabinet oil was more expensive and fuel at the pump cheaper, while now oil is cheaper and fuel more expensive. | Misleading |
“the prices of crude and of oil were higher, and Bulgarians paid less at the pump. Now prices are lower, but they pay” Misleading
The pump half is confirmed. According to the European Commission's Weekly Oil Bulletin, the highest prices under the caretaker cabinet were about 1.48 euros/l for A95 and 1.77 euros/l for diesel (20 April). At the end of October they are 1.63–1.65 euros/l for A95 and 1.88–1.89 euros/l for diesel, i.e. about 10% higher. The oil half is not true as of the debate. According to EIA data, Brent was about 71 dollars a barrel at the end of February, 85–111 dollars in March, 110–125 dollars in April and 106–120 dollars in early May. In October 2026 it is 120–127 dollars, at or above the April peak. Cheaper oil under the new government occurred only in the summer (70–96 dollars in June–August), and at that time fuel in Bulgaria was also cheaper, for example about 1.46 euros/l for A95 and 1.48 euros/l for diesel in early July. Nor has it been shown that the lower pump prices in April were “thanks to our work”. The caretaker cabinet did not cut excise duty or VAT across the board. The 20-euro compensation and the reduced excise duty for farmers do not lower the pump price. Retail prices follow oil with a lag and with movements in diesel margins. It is true that today, with a similar Brent price, we pay more, but Gyurov's comparison distorts the direction for oil and attributes the effect to his own measures. Sources
Other fact-checks DW: Отчасти вярноzakogo.com: Опровергано (Г72) | |||
| 1:05:06 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the electricity compensation for businesses under the caretaker cabinet was monthly, while now businesses will wait until next year for their compensation. | True |
“back then they were done on a monthly basis, now businesses will wait for their compensation next year.” True
In October 2025 the Zhelyazkov cabinet introduced electricity compensation for businesses, calculated and paid once every six months. At the end of April 2026 the caretaker cabinet switched to monthly calculation and payment from 1 April 2026, when the monthly exchange price is above 122.71 euros/MWh. The Radev cabinet's programme for 1 September 2026 – 30 June 2027, adopted in September, provides for the compensation to be paid in a single instalment after the end of the 10-month period. Payment must be completed by 31 December 2027. There is a monthly interim compensation only if the average exchange price for the month exceeds 180 euros/MWh, and only for the part above that threshold. At prices between 122 and 180 euros/MWh, businesses will indeed receive their support only in 2027. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Потвърдено (Г73) | |||
| 1:05:47 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the caretaker cabinet gave 20 euros for fuel, but only 16% of people took it up. | Mostly true |
“of oil and fuel, under pressure you gave people 20 euros so they could use them” Mostly true
The programme under Decision No. 229 of 20 March 2026 provides a monthly compensation of 20 euros. Those eligible are adults with an income of up to 652.41 euros a month (twice the poverty line) who own a car with third-party liability insurance. The compensation kicks in when the average price of A95 or diesel exceeds 1.60 euros/l for three consecutive days. When it was announced, a figure of about 1.38 million people was given (24 March), and later the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy estimated 1,145,000 eligible people. In practice far fewer receive the compensation. For March, 210,934 people were supported: 182,856 automatically, as recipients of social assistance, and 28,078 after applying, out of nearly 50,000 applications submitted. For April the figure is about 232,000 people. That is 15–18% of the original 1.38 million and 18–20% of 1.145 million. The figure of 16% falls within this range, although it is not an official indicator. The low coverage is mainly due to the narrow conditions: only one car, valid insurance, an income check by the National Revenue Agency, and an application for everyone outside the social assistance system. The International Monetary Fund, for its part, cites the same scheme as an example of fast and cheap targeting. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Непроверимо (Й92); 20-те евро: Потвърдено (Й91) | |||
| 1:06:18 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that his measures supported those most in need and the sectors that pass costs on to consumers fastest, and that this is why there was no inflation. | False |
“and we supported the sectors that pass the price on to the end consumer fastest. That's why there was no inflation.” False
The description of the measures matches the documents. The 20-euro compensation is for people with an income of up to twice the poverty line. The 27 March package targets transport, agriculture and energy: a postponed increase in toll charges, more state aid for hauliers, earlier payments and lower excise duty for farmers, monthly electricity compensation. The conclusion “that's why there was no inflation”, however, is refuted by the NSI. In April 2026 monthly inflation was 1.8%, the highest of the year, and annual inflation was 6.8%. In March monthly inflation was 0.9%. Annual inflation doubled under the caretaker cabinet, from 3.3% in February to 6.8% in April. One can argue about how far the measures limited a further rise, but the claim that there was no inflation is false. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Описанието на мерките: Потвърдено (Г75); „нямаше инфлация“: Опровергано (Г76) | |||
| 1:06:30 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that at the IMF spring meetings his government's measures were presented as an example of timely and effective measures. | Mostly true |
“meetings of the International Monetary Fund, precisely these measures from Bulgaria, from our government, were presented” Mostly true
The IMF does cite Bulgaria as an example. In a note accompanying the remarks of the Deputy Director of the European Department, Oya Celasun, to the Eurogroup in Brussels on 4 May 2026, the Fund writes that some countries acted quickly with targeted measures at limited cost. As examples it cites Bulgaria and Thailand, which introduced temporary targeted payments for the poorest 20% of the population. The note describes the automatic inclusion of social assistance recipients and the checking of others through tax data on income and car ownership. In the same note the IMF criticises the widespread excise duty cuts in the EU. The venue is inaccurate. The IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings were held on 13–18 April. The press conference on the Fiscal Monitor on 15 April did not mention Bulgaria, and Finance Minister Klisurski met the IMF leadership without any published assessment of the measures. The note concerns only the 20-euro targeted payments, not the whole package. It calls them fast and cheap, but not “effective”, i.e. it does not assess their effect. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Г77) | |||
| 1:08:12 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that as chair of the PP parliamentary group he removed the administrative reform proposals from the 2022 budget so that they would go through the normal procedure with public consultation. | Mostly true |
“Even back then, when I was chair of the We Continue the Change parliamentary group, there was a proposal in the 2022 budget for administrative reform. Back then, I, as chair of the parliamentary group, removed these proposals from the draft budget,” Mostly true
The transcript of the second reading of the 2022 budget (25 February 2022) confirms that the paragraphs on structural reform in the transitional and final provisions were dropped. These include, for example, the merger of the Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre Agency, GRAO and the Registry Agency, and the status of registry judges. The Budget Committee proposed dropping them following proposals by MPs from PP (Lyubomir Karimanski and others), GERB-SDS (Desislava Atanasova and others) and DPS (transcript). At the time Gyurov was chair of the PP group. It was said explicitly in the chamber that the idea was for the texts to be withdrawn and reintroduced as separate bills. This matches the reason Gyurov gives. The inaccuracy is in his personal role. The proposals to drop the texts were not tabled by Gyurov personally but by several groups, including the opposition. The proposal tabled by Gyurov and others concerns other provisions (funding for higher education institutions and entry into force). Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г81): текстовете отпадат по предложения на няколко групи, лична роля на Гюров не е назована | |||
| 1:08:44 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Yotova signed the 2026 budget quickly instead of returning it, even though everyone warned of unconstitutional provisions, rights being taken away and adoption without public consultation. | Mostly true |
“This is what you didn't do with the current budget, when everyone was warning that there were unconstitutional provisions in it, when rights are being taken away from Bulgarian citizens and this is being done on the fast track without public consultation. This budget was pardoned and went through very quickly, instead of being sent back for public consultation.” Mostly true
Timeline: the Ministry of Finance published the draft on 24 June 2026 with a deadline for comments of noon on 26 June, i.e. about two days (Economic.bg). The Council of Ministers tabled it on 1 July, the National Assembly adopted it on 24 July (Constitutional Court Decision No. 17), and on 29 July Yotova announced that she would promulgate it instead of returning it (president.bg). The law was promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 69 of 31 July 2026. It is true that the law contained unconstitutional provisions. On 20 October 2026 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional two amendments made via the transitional and final provisions: the calculation of length of service (Article 355 of the Labour Code) and the salaries of junior magistrates (Article 218(2) of the Judiciary Act). On the first, the court says it is a “lasting, significant change to existing rights of citizens”. In her statement Yotova also accepts that amendments to laws via the transitional and final provisions should go through public consultation and risk assessment. “Everyone was warning” is exaggerated. Of 69 submissions to the presidency, four call for a veto, and the presidency's legal team and, according to Yotova, “many of the submissions received” find no unconstitutionality. “Without public consultation” is also inaccurate: the draft was published for comments, albeit for only about two days. In addition, by law the budget does not go through the standard public consultation, which the Constitutional Court notes in its decision. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Г82) за „всички предупреждаваха“; Недоказано (Г83, Г84) за късата писта и бързината | |||
| 1:09:12 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the previous regular government fell over a budget and that the current budget is worse than the one that brought it down. | Mostly true |
“After the previous government fell over a budget, and the current one is now turning out to be worse than the one that brought down the previous regular government.” Mostly true
The first draft of the 2026 budget was withdrawn on 3 December 2025, Prime Minister Zhelyazkov resigned on 11 December 2025, and parliament accepted the resignation on 12 December 2025 (Constitutional Court Decision No. 17). The protests from 26 November began precisely against the draft budget (higher taxes and social security contributions), and after its withdrawal they continued with demands for resignation and against corruption (Meduza). The claim that the government “fell over a budget” is simplified, but in substance it matches what happened. “Worse” is an assessment. There are, however, figures: in the draft of 8 December 2025 the government set a deficit of 3.0% of GDP, while the adopted 2026 law sets 5.7% on the consolidated fiscal programme (Constitutional Court, Decision No. 17). The comparison is debatable, because the budget was adopted in July under a different fiscal picture. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г85): КС записва оттегляне и оставка, без причина | |||
| 1:12:32 | Yotova | Yotova says that Asen Vassilev and Academician Denkov took the partial budget to the Constitutional Court to have it declared unconstitutional. | Mostly true |
“and Academician Denkov took this partial budget to the Constitutional Court so that it would be declared unconstitutional.” Mostly true
Asen Vassilev's We Continue the Change did indeed refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. On 28 July 2026 Vassilev and Denkov handed Yotova a petition for a veto (bTV). On 29 July Vassilev announced that PP and other groups would file a challenge (BTA), and on 31 July the challenges were filed (Tribuna, Filter). What is inaccurate is what exactly they asked for. The request for the entire law to be declared unconstitutional because of the 5.7% deficit is a separate one, by 50 MPs (Case No. 15/2026), and the media link it to GERB-SDS (Vladislav Goranov). The request linked to PP is by 53 MPs (Case No. 16/2026) and is only against individual provisions of the transitional and final provisions: length of service, the minimum wage and magistrates' salaries (Constitutional Court Decision No. 17). The Constitutional Court's decision does not name the petitioners. Publicly, PP's challenge was presented by Stoyu Stoev, not by Denkov. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й98): КС не назовава Василев и Денков | |||
| 1:12:40 | Yotova | Yotova says that a week earlier the Constitutional Court ruled that the budget is not unconstitutional and struck down only two provisions of a technical nature, which the presidency had also pointed out in its remarks. | Mostly true |
“Just one week ago the Constitutional Court said that this budget is not unconstitutional and struck down two provisions of it, which will most likely be corrected in the next budget and which, I want to tell our viewers, are of a technical nature.” Mostly true
True: with Decision No. 17 of 20 October 2026, nine days before the debate, the Constitutional Court rejects the request for the entire 2026 State Budget Act to be declared unconstitutional. The court declares unconstitutional two provisions adopted via the transitional and final provisions: the new calculation of length of service in hours (Article 355(1)–(4) of the Labour Code) and the linking of junior magistrates' salaries to 60% of an MP's salary (Article 218(2) of the Judiciary Act) (Decision No. 17). It is not true that the provisions are “technical”. On length of service, the court says it is a “lasting, significant change to existing rights of citizens”. On magistrates, it finds a violation of Article 133 of the Constitution. It is partly true that the presidency pointed them out. In her statement of 29 July 2026, Yotova calls “understandable” the concerns about amendments to existing laws via the transitional and final provisions, but does not name specific provisions. Moreover, she explicitly says that the presidency's legal team finds no grounds for unconstitutionality (president.bg). Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Й99, Й100) за решението и двата текста; Недоказано (Й101) за забележките на президентството | |||
| 1:13:03 | Yotova | Yotova says that she signed the budget not hastily but after a 2.5-hour conversation with Vassilev and Denkov and many submissions, because returning it would have blocked the state. | Mostly true |
“I signed it not hastily, but on the contrary – for two and a half hours I listened to Mr Vassilev and Mr Denkov and many other opinions and experts. [...] I signed it because otherwise we would have completely blocked the state, if I had sent it back to the National Assembly.” Mostly true
The meeting took place. On 28 July 2026 Vassilev and Denkov handed Yotova a petition for a veto and talked with her, and Vassilev says the President's team “seriously discussed the grounds” (bTV). On 29 July she announced that she was promulgating the law and referred to 69 submissions. She said explicitly that returning it would put the public finances at even greater risk and would block municipalities, social payments, healthcare and education (president.bg). The law was adopted on 24 July and the decision was announced on 29 July, within the 15-day constitutional deadline under Article 88(3). The 2.5-hour duration is not confirmed by any public source. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й102): изявлението не споменава срещата и продължителността ѝ | |||
| 1:13:32 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that under the extension budget the state could function perfectly calmly and there was no need to sign the budget hastily. | Mostly true |
“We were on an extension budget, under which the state could function perfectly calmly,” Mostly true
The extension law adopted on 17 December 2025 allows the state to collect revenue and make expenditure until the budget is adopted. An amendment of 18 March 2026 removed its three-month term, and it applies until the new budget is adopted (Constitutional Court Decision No. 17). The state did not stop payments: wages, pensions and current expenditure continued under the extended budget. Operating under the extension law, however, was not without problems. The law was amended three more times, and on 18 June 2026 the Council of Ministers was explicitly given the right to take on new debt to finance the deficit. According to the Ministry of Finance's budgetary plan, expenditure in 2026 grows under the extended budget without any new policies or investment decisions (Draft Budgetary Plan 2027). “Perfectly calmly” is an assessment. The state functioned, but at the cost of repeated amendments and borrowing. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г88): „спокойно“ е оценка | |||
| 1:14:30 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the Gyurov cabinet worked for seven months, ran out of money for salaries at the end and therefore withdrew money from the BDB, claiming it was for salaries. | False |
“if I'm not mistaken, 7 months, you know very well that in the end you didn't even have money for salaries. And that's why your conversation with me, at one of the meetings, was your proposal to take money from the Bulgarian Development Bank so you could cover the state's expenses.” False
It is true that the BDB decision was the caretaker cabinet's. By Decision No. 309 of 22 April 2026, signed by Gyurov, the bank's capital was reduced from 2,625,781,150 to 1,180,613,634.77 euros, i.e. by about 1.445 billion euros. The aim was to return to the budget the unused part of the capital increase made by Decision No. 575 of 2025 of the Zhelyazkov cabinet. It is not true that the cabinet governed for seven months. It was in office for 78 days (19 February–8 May 2026). Seven months, from January to the end of July, is how long the budget extension law was in force, not the caretaker cabinet. The documents contradict the claim that there was no money for salaries and that Gyurov said so. As of 30 April 2026 the fiscal reserve stood at 6.8 billion euros, of which 5.28 billion euros were deposits. On 29 April Finance Minister Klisurski stated that no money from the reserve was being used for April because the monthly deficit had been brought down to zero. On 22 April Gyurov stated that the caretaker cabinet would not spend the BDB money and that the decision on how to use it was left to the regular government. The Ministry of Finance clarified that the money stays in the fiscal reserve and does not affect the deficit. Concerns about salaries and pensions due to a lack of liquidity, if no new debt was taken on, were voiced later, on 3 June, by the Radev cabinet's finance minister Galab Donev. What Gyurov told Yotova at their meeting cannot be verified. His public statements from that time, however, are the opposite of “an acute shortage of money for salaries”. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: 7 месеца: Опровергано (Й103); няма пари за заплати: Опровергано (Й104); разговорът: Непроверимо (Й105); решението е на Гюров: Потвърдено (Й110); твърдял е, че са за заплати: Недоказано (Й111) | |||
| 1:15:09 | Yotova | Yotova claims that it is not true that the budget cuts labour rights: the Constitutional Court only objected that the provision on leave and hourly work must be adopted through another law, not via the transitional and final provisions. | Misleading |
“Again, we need to be fair. We are talking about one provision of the law, which is related to leave and to hourly work. And the Constitutional Court's objection is that this has to happen, or if it happens at all, it will happen by amending another law, and it cannot be done through the transitional and final provisions.” Misleading
It is true that the Constitutional Court declares the provision unconstitutional on procedural-constitutional grounds. The court finds that changes not directly related to revenue and expenditure for the year cannot be made via the transitional and final provisions of the budget law (Article 84, item 2 of the Constitution), and does not say that the legislature cannot change the way length of service is calculated (Decision No. 17). The court, however, describes the substance of the change as a “lasting, significant change to existing rights of citizens”. The new Article 355 of the Labour Code would have counted as a day of service only a full working day actually worked, and for part-time work length of service would be calculated proportionally. A four-hour working day would have earned half a day of service. Length of service determines the right to paid annual leave, the length-of-service pay supplement and other rights. The change was to apply from 1 January 2027. Therefore the claim that the provision does not affect labour rights creates a false impression. The court strikes it down because of how it was adopted, but explicitly notes that it significantly changes rights. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й106) за „не орязва права“; Потвърдено (Й107, Й108) за отпуските, почасовата работа и възражението на КС | |||
| 1:15:31 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the struck-down provisions took away rights from people working half-time, such as students and young mothers. | Mostly true |
“And it has to be discussed in the normal way, so that people, those working half-time, like working students, like young mothers, can see that their rights really are being stolen.” Mostly true
The struck-down §11 of the budget's transitional and final provisions amends Article 355 of the Labour Code. For part-time work, length of service would have been calculated proportionally, i.e. a 4-hour day counts as half a day of service. It is precisely part-time workers who are affected. The Constitutional Court describes the change as a “lasting, significant change to existing rights of citizens”, since leave, additional pay and other rights depend on length of service (Decision No. 17). Missing context: the provision was never applied. Under §12 the old rules remain until 31 December 2026, and the court struck it down on 20 October 2026. The government's rationale was the fight against fictitious 4-hour contracts. Students and young mothers are the speaker's examples; the decision does not mention them. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г89): КС говори за значима промяна на права, не за орязване | |||
| 1:15:52 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that when his cabinet left office there were 6.8 billion euros in the fiscal reserve, and so paying salaries was never in question. | True |
“When we left, there were 6.8 billion euros in the fiscal reserve, sitting there, so the question of paying salaries and where the money should come from never arose.” True
The last monthly report before the handover on 8 May is as of 30 April 2026. In it the fiscal reserve is 6,803.5 million euros: 5,282.7 million euros in deposits at the BNB and banks and 1,520.9 million euros in receivables from EU funds. The figure of 6.8 billion euros is accurate. There is no evidence that the payment of salaries was at risk during the caretaker cabinet's term. In April the cabinet did not draw money from the reserve. The BDB money was returned to the budget and not spent. Context: the reserve fell from about 8.24 billion euros at the end of January to 6.8 billion euros at the end of April. Part of it, 1.52 billion euros, consists of EU receivables, not cash. The cash deficit at the end of April was 1.76 billion euros, the highest in the past 15 years according to the Fiscal Council. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: 6,8 млрд.: Потвърдено (Г95); „никога не е имало въпрос за заплати“: Недоказано (Г90) | |||
| 1:16:05 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the money was withdrawn from the BDB because the bank was being used as a piggy bank for well-connected companies, and that it was returned to the budget for the next government. | Mostly true |
“The reason we took the money out of the Bulgarian Development Bank, which was criticised afterwards, is because it had been parked there so that the bank could be used as a piggy bank for well-connected companies.” Mostly true
The factual part is correct. Decision No. 309 of 22 April 2026 reduces the BDB's capital by about 1.445 billion euros in order to return to the state budget the unused part of the capital increase made in 2025. The Ministry of Finance announces that the money stays in the fiscal reserve, that the caretaker cabinet will not spend it and that the decision is for the regular government. According to former caretaker minister Klisurski, the Radev cabinet later already used it, while Deputy Prime Minister Pulev claims the opposite. Final ECB approval of the reduction is still pending. The “piggy bank for well-connected companies” motive is an accusation. Gyurov made it as early as 22 April, when he spoke of “the old government's piggy-bank bank” and of taking the money out “before it filled someone's pockets”. The Fiscal Council calls the capitalisation of the BDB “instead of budget expenditure” a fiscal trick, i.e. it criticises the accounting method. We found no audit or other official document establishing that these 1.445 billion euros were granted to or intended for connected companies. By Gyurov's own account, the money sat unused for eight months. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: „касичка за приближени фирми“: Непроверимо (Г91); извадени и върнати в бюджета: Потвърдено (Г92) | |||
| 1:17:12 | Yotova | Yotova claims that of the 69 submissions the presidency received on the budget, only three were against it. | Mostly true |
“First, of the 69 submissions the presidential institution received on this budget, only three were against, Mr Gyurov.” Mostly true
The figure 69 is correct. The President's statement of 29 July 2026 says that the presidency received 69 submissions from parties, trade unions and civil-society organisations (president.bg). According to the same text, however, four of them contain reasoned requests for a veto, not three. The statement does not give a separate count of “negative” submissions; it says only that the calls for the budget to enter into force are “many times more than the negative submissions”. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Й109): четири, не три | |||
| 1:17:58 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the new government inherited a budget that was not at zero but in deficit by nearly 3 billion. | False |
“If you returned it to the national budget, why, when the new government came in, did it find not just a budget at zero, but one at nearly minus 3 billion?” False
The latest data before the handover on 8 May are as of the end of April 2026. The deficit on the consolidated fiscal programme is 1,761.1 million euros, or 1.4% of GDP. By the end of May it is 2.5 billion euros, but this includes more than three weeks of the Radev cabinet in office, and in May alone the deficit is 0.74 billion euros. No official report at the time of the handover shows “nearly minus 3 billion”. In June–July, Finance Minister Donev speaks of 2.2 billion euros in unpaid or deferred obligations on projects of municipalities and ministries. According to him, however, these have accumulated since 2024 and are not a deficit inherited from the caretaker cabinet. For expenditure arising directly from the caretaker cabinet's decisions, Donev speaks of about 500 million euros. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Невярноzakogo.com: Недоказано (Й112) | |||
| 1:18:48 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the 2026 budget puts current and future generations into debt and that this year, for the first time, Bulgarians' purchasing power is falling. | Misleading |
“First, to say about the previous budget, why it was bad for Bulgarian citizens: because with it we were being put into debt, now and future generations, and for the first time this year the purchasing power of Bulgarian citizens is falling, and for the first time this year we are not among the three biggest countries in the European Union that have the lowest debt to Bulgarian citizens.” Misleading
The first part is an assessment, but it has a basis. The 2026 budget has a deficit of 5.7% of GDP, and in June the government approves a ceiling on new debt of 3.8 billion euros. The second part is not borne out by average income data. According to the NSI, the average gross wage in the second quarter of 2026 is 1,444 euros, 9.8% higher than a year earlier. Annual inflation for the same months averages about 6.4% (6.8% in April, 6.9% in May, 5.4% in June), i.e. real growth is about 3%. In the private sector, wages are rising by 11.5%. For some people, real income is indeed falling. In the public sector, wages are rising by only 4.8%, below inflation. Pensioners also lose purchasing power until the indexation of 1 July, because of the price surge in the spring. But the claim is general, about “the purchasing power of Bulgarian citizens”, and the average data show growth. “For the first time” is not proven either. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Непроверимо (Г96) | |||
| 1:18:48 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that this year, for the first time, Bulgaria is not among the three EU countries with the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio. | Mostly true |
“…and for the first time this year we are not among the three […] countries in the European Union that have the lowest debt…” Mostly true
According to Eurostat data of 21 October 2026, at the end of 2025 Bulgaria ranks fourth for lowest government debt (29.9% of GDP), after Estonia (24.0%), Luxembourg (26.0%) and Denmark (27.2%). It is also fourth in the latest quarterly data, as of the end of June 2026 (28.7%). Eurostat's annual series show that from 2008 to 2024 Bulgaria was second or third for lowest debt every year. “For the first time” is true for the period since 2008. In 2004–2007, however, Bulgaria ranked 6th–9th, so dropping out of the top three is not unprecedented. “This year” refers to the 2025 data published in 2026. Debt grew mostly in 2025, from 23.7% to 29.9% of GDP, under the Zhelyazkov cabinet. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Г97) | |||
| 1:19:56 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the draft 2027 budget was hidden before the elections and the details were not shown. | Mostly true |
“If it's that good, we should have seen the details of it as well.” Mostly true
As of the day of the debate (29 October 2026), the 2027 state budget bill has not been published. Deputy Prime Minister Pekanov says the same day that it will be presented “most likely next week”, i.e. after the runoff on 1 November, as talks with the European Commission are continuing. The outlet notes that this misses the statutory deadline for submission to the National Assembly by the end of October (Blitz). Missing context: the main parameters are not secret. On 15 October 2026, before the first round, the Ministry of Finance sent to the European Commission and published the Draft Budgetary Plan for 2027, with a deficit of 4.3% of GDP, revenue measures of about 1.96 billion euros, and increases in pensions and wages (European Commission). Gyurov himself cites data from this plan. The detailed projections by ministry, however, are not public before the elections. “Hidden” is an assessment of motive that cannot be verified. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г98): РМС № 598 изисква внасяне в НС до 15.10.2026, решението не казва дали е оповестен | |||
| 1:20:28 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the 2027 budget contains a further 1.5 billion euros against “empty line items” that the government can spend without accountability. | Unverifiable |
“and another additional 1.5 billion euros against empty line items. That is, once again pouring money into a line item that the government can spend without any accountability.” Unverifiable
The 2027 budget bill has not been published as of the day of the debate, so the line-by-line allocation cannot be verified. The public Draft Budgetary Plan for 2027 (15 October 2026) contains no expenditure or reserve of about 1.5 billion euros without a designated purpose (DBP 2027). The closest item in size in the plan is the rise in nationally financed capital expenditure from 2.7% to 3.4% of GDP. That is approximately 1 billion euros, but it is not an “empty line item”. The source of the figure is not given. Asen Vassilev has spoken publicly about growth in operating expenditure and unallocated capital expenditure, but these are the opposition's assessments, not a document. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г101): законопроектът не е публикуван, ПБП не съдържа такъв разход | |||
| 1:20:51 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that about 1 million pensioners will remain below the poverty line. | Mostly true |
“There are about one million pensioners who will remain below the poverty line.” Mostly true
As of the end of June 2026, nearly 750,000 pensioners receive a total pension below the 2026 poverty line (390.63 euros), according to National Social Security Institute data cited in the media. Excluding survivor's pensions, they number over 700,000. From 1 July the minimum pension is 347.51 euros, still below the line. For 2027, a new poverty line of 443 euros from 1 January was discussed at the tripartite council. At current pension levels, about 1.29 million pensioners would fall below it until the next indexation on 1 July 2027 (about 8% under the draft budget). “About 1 million” lies between the current 0.75 million and the 1.29 million under the new line, i.e. the order of magnitude is plausible. The claim is a forecast. The exact number depends on the final poverty line and on the indexation. Being below the poverty line by pension amount does not necessarily mean a household is poor by income. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Непроверимо (Г103) | |||
| 1:22:05 | Yotova | Yotova says that she will sign the 2027 budget even if Gyurov wins, because the budget is signed by the end of the year. | Mostly true |
“Mr Gyurov, I will be the one to sign the next budget. Because even if, through some very serious combination of bad circumstances, you win the elections, you should know that the budget is signed by the end of the year.” Mostly true
The legal basis is correct. The President's term is five years (Article 93(1)). Yotova took office as President on 23 January 2026 “until the end of the term” (Article 97(3)), which began on 22 January 2022 (the Constitution, biography). The newly elected President takes office on 22 January 2027. Any law adopted by the end of December will be promulgated or returned by Yotova. Missing context: “the budget is signed by the end of the year” is the rule, but not a guarantee. The 2026 budget was promulgated only on 29 July 2026. Past the statutory deadline, the 2027 bill has still not been submitted to parliament as of 29 October (Blitz). If adoption is delayed beyond 22 January, the decree will be the new President's. Sources
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| 1:22:24 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the Radev government had been in office for one month when the European Commission opened an excessive deficit procedure against Bulgaria over a deficit of nearly 5.8%. | False |
“Look, there's no way you can convince me that everything was fine, when the government, Mr Radev's latest one, was exactly one month old when the European Commission announced an excessive deficit procedure against Bulgaria at nearly 5.8. Maybe it's a little less, by a few hundredths.” False
The timing is approximately correct. The Commission opens the procedure with a report under Article 126(3) TFEU on 3 June 2026, 26 days after the Radev cabinet took office on 8 May. An opinion follows on 25 June, and on 10 July the Council of the EU adopts a decision that an excessive deficit exists in Bulgaria. The figure, however, is wrong. Council Decision (EU) 2026/1758 and the Commission's report are based on a deficit of 3.5% of GDP for 2025, per Eurostat data of 22 April, and on the Commission's spring forecast of 4.1% for 2026. There is no figure of around 5.8% in the EU documents. The closest is the 5.7% deficit in the draft 2026 budget, which Finance Minister Donev presents on 24 June, three weeks after the Commission's report. In other words, it is a figure of the Radev government itself. As causes of the deterioration, the Commission points to public-sector wage growth, especially in defence and security, the automatic indexation of pensions and capital transfers to Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) in 2025. For 2026, it points to continued structural growth in wages and social spending without offsetting measures. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Невярноzakogo.com: Опровергано (Й114) | |||
| 1:22:48 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the excessive deficit stems either from inaccurate eurozone data from 2024, under minister Vassilev, or from a jump under the caretaker cabinet. | Misleading |
“There are two explanations. Either the documents Bulgaria sent when we set out to become a member of the eurozone were inaccurate, false, hidden. And these documents date back to 1924, when the finance minister was Mr Vassilev. Or the other one, that during your caretaker cabinet this inflation jumped so much.” Misleading
The first explanation is not supported by the data. The deficit for 2024 is 3.0% of GDP both in the April 2025 notification and in the latest one of October 2026, unchanged and without Eurostat reservations. Asen Vassilev was finance minister until April 2024. Data for 2024 are reported in 2025, and the request for extraordinary convergence reports was signed on 25 February 2025 by Finance Minister Temenuzhka Petkova and BNB Governor Dimitar Radev. Eurostat has a reservation only on the 2025 data, over the recording of operations of the Road Infrastructure Agency, which add 0.6% of GDP. That is precisely why the 2025 deficit was revised from 3.5% to 4.0%. No falsification has been found, and 2025 is not Vassilev's year anyway. The second explanation is also incomplete. The procedure is based on the 2025 deficit (3.5%), the year before the caretaker cabinet, and on the Commission's forecast for 2026 (4.1%). The Commission explains it with decisions on wages, pensions and social spending, not with actions of the caretaker cabinet. It is true that the cash deficit at the end of April 2026 is high (1.76 billion euros, 1.4% of GDP). However, it also includes January–February, before Gyurov. The choice between “false documents” and “the caretaker cabinet” leaves out the main explanation the Commission gives. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Невярно („фалшиви“ документи)zakogo.com: Документите от времето на Василев: Опровергано (Й115); „фалшиви“: Непроверимо (Й125) | |||
| 1:23:14 | Yotova | Yotova says that the 2027 budget is our first budget in the eurozone, that it has been sent to the European Commission and that it reduces the deficit without touching social benefits. | Mostly true |
“Now the government has to make sure that, on the one hand, it meets the criteria of a budget, this is our first budget in euros, of the eurozone, and that's why it sent it to the European Commission, to try to reduce this deficit and at the same time not to touch people's social benefits.” Mostly true
It is true that the government sent the plan to the European Commission. On 15 October 2026 the Ministry of Finance sent the Draft Budgetary Plan for 2027 to the European Commission and the Eurogroup. The document calls itself the “First Draft Budgetary Plan”, i.e. the first such plan as a member of the eurozone (DBP 2027). The general government deficit is planned to fall from about 5.0% in 2026 to 4.3% in 2027. “Our first budget in euros” is inaccurate. The 2026 budget was already drawn up and adopted in euros, in July 2026, when Bulgaria was in the eurozone. What is first for 2027 is the budgetary plan under eurozone rules. Social spending as a whole is rising: pensions by about 8%, a social package and measures for children worth 142.6 million euros, social transfers up to 12.5% of GDP. The plan, however, also includes savings of 228.7 million euros through the reform of the TELK disability assessment system, tighter control over access to social assistance and the removal, from 1 July 2026, of the “COVID supplement” for newly granted pensions. “Does not touch social benefits” is broadly true, but not entirely. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й116) за „първи бюджет“; Потвърдено (Й117) за изпращането в ЕК; Недоказано (Й118) за „не посяга“ | |||
| 1:24:04 | Yotova | Yotova claims that at present there is almost no EU country with a budget deficit below 3%. | False |
“and there's almost no country in the European Union at the moment that is below the 3% limit,” False
According to Eurostat data of 21 October 2026 for 2025, 16 of the 27 EU countries have a deficit below 3% of GDP, and five of them run a surplus: Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 11 countries have a deficit of 3% or more: Romania, Poland, Belgium, France, Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy and Croatia. The average EU deficit is 3.1%. Under the Commission's forecasts for 2026, too, about 12 countries remain below 3%, among them Czechia, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Croatia. About half of EU countries are below the threshold, not “almost none”. Sources
Other fact-checks | |||
| 1:25:20 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the deficit cited is based on the projections in the new budget, not on the budget the caretaker cabinet was implementing, and that the state has taken no measures. | Mostly true |
“Very quick answer: the excessive deficit is on the basis of the new projections under the new budget, not the one we were implementing. But it was inherited. It was inherited, and that's exactly where we saw no measures whatsoever on the part of the state.” Mostly true
If this refers to Yotova's figure of “nearly 5.8%”, Gyurov is right: 5.7% is the deficit in the draft 2026 budget presented by the Radev cabinet on 24 June. Execution under the caretaker cabinet is on a cash basis: 1.76 billion euros, or 1.4% of GDP, at the end of April. The procedure itself, however, is not based on the new budget. It is based on the 3.5% deficit for 2025 and on the Commission's spring forecast of 4.1% for 2026, made under the extension budget law that the caretaker cabinet was also implementing. The Commission writes that Bulgaria had not communicated a planned deficit for 2026. So the deficit was partly “inherited” by the caretaker cabinet as well, not just created by the new budget. “We saw no measures whatsoever” is an assessment. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Г104) | |||
| 1:25:55 | Yotova | Yotova claims that previous governments hid expenditure, took profits of state-owned companies in advance and did not pay municipalities, in order to report a 3% deficit. | Mostly true |
“that expenditure will no longer be hidden, that the profits of Bulgarian enterprises will no longer be taken in advance, that the non-payment of money to the municipalities for two years will stop, because they are already wondering where and how to finance these projects, all just so that we can say we have a 3% deficit. To me, those were false documents.” Mostly true
Most of the elements have a documentary basis. In February 2026 the Fiscal Council calls “fiscal tricks” the seizure of 100% of state-owned companies' dividends, the advance tax on banks and the capitalisation of the BDB instead of budget expenditure. All of these are from 2025. In the National Assembly on 15 July 2026, Finance Minister Donev cites 1.013 billion euros in revenue collected in advance in 2025. MP Prodanov breaks it down into 369 million euros of advance tax from banks, about 570 million euros in dividends and about 85 million euros in advance excise duties on tobacco. Donev also says that in 2024 and 2025 the Investment Programme for municipal projects was not financially secured and payments were minimal. He puts the unpaid projects of municipalities and ministries at 2.2 billion euros. Two caveats. Former ministers Petkova and Vassilev respond that the advance tax is legal and that, for the deficit under Eurostat methodology (accrual basis), taxes are recorded in the year in which they are due. That is, the “tricks” improve the cash position but not necessarily the deficit the EU measures. Moreover, the “3%” target was not met for 2025: the deficit is 3.5%, and 4.0% after the revision. Yotova presents “false documents” as a personal assessment (“to me”). Eurostat has not found any falsification. The 2024 data (3.0%) have not been changed, and for 2025 there is a reservation only on the recording of Road Infrastructure Agency operations. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Криели разходи / авансови печалби: Недоказано (Й123); общините две години: Недоказано (Й124); „фалшиви“: Непроверимо (Й125) | |||
| 1:26:25 | Yotova | Yotova says that the leaders of the parties behind Gyurov promised a “golden rain” of investment and no price rises from the euro, and that today we can see what is happening with prices. | Misleading |
“And your spokespeople for your parties, your party chairs, were saying how there would be a golden rain of investment here. And note, there would be no price increases at all. Today we see what is happening.” Misleading
Prices are indeed rising. According to NSI data, annual inflation in September 2026 is 5.7% by the CPI (5.6% by the HICP), and since the start of the year, i.e. since the introduction of the euro on 1 January, it is 4.2% by the CPI (4.9% by the HICP). The promise is described more categorically than it was made. In May 2025 Asen Vassilev said that the experience of other countries shows that “there is no price jump” and that the effect is “of the order of 0.2–0.3%”. This is a claim about the effect of the currency changeover, not a promise that prices would not rise. In July 2025 he even warned that the amendments to the Euro Act would push prices up. We did not find a quote about a “golden rain of investment”. NSI data do not separate how much of the price rise is due to the euro and how much to other factors (for example fuel, which rose 5–6% in a month in September). So “today we see what is happening” implies a causal link that the statistics do not show. Sources
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| 1:26:38 | Yotova | Yotova says that “the President and I” requested a referendum on the euro. | Mostly true |
“That's why we, the President and I, requested this referendum. That's why we wanted this referendum, so that it would be clear to Bulgarian citizens that there would be processes, and they would be difficult.” Mostly true
The proposal for a national referendum on whether Bulgaria should adopt the euro in 2026 was signed and submitted to the National Assembly on 12 May 2025 by President Rumen Radev (president.bg). The right to make such a proposal belongs to the President; the Vice President has no independent role, and Yotova is not mentioned in the official announcement. As Vice President she was part of the institution requesting the referendum, so “the President and I” is a stretch rather than false. Sources Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й127): съобщението назовава само Радев | |||
| 1:26:50 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the Constitutional Court ruled that the euro referendum is unconstitutional. | False |
“This referendum, as the Constitutional Court ruled, is unconstitutional. So insisting on such a referendum is, once again, populism.” False
The Constitutional Court has never declared the referendum unconstitutional. With Ruling No. 1 of 23 January 2026 in Case No. 21/2025, the court dismissed as inadmissible the request of 51 MPs against the National Assembly's decision on the President's proposal and terminated the case without ruling on the merits (Ruling No. 1). The reasoning is that the euro was already introduced on 1 January 2026 by decisions of the Council of the EU. The answer to the question cannot produce legal effects, so there is no constitutional dispute. The court explicitly declines to rule separately on whether the question itself complies with the Constitution. Earlier, on 18 November 2025, the Constitutional Court held in an interpretative decision that the Speaker of the National Assembly, Natalia Kiselova, had no right to reject the President's proposal on her own. The assessment of admissibility belongs to parliament as a whole (Radio Free Europe). The argument that it is unconstitutional is Kiselova's, from May 2025, and that of some MPs, not the Constitutional Court's. Sources
Other fact-checks Клуб Z: Невярно (Г №2): КС отклонява искането без решение по съществоzakogo: Опровергано (Г105)Actualno (коментар): Защитава прочита на Гюров: съдът показал, че „няма място за спор“ | |||
| 1:27:10 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that the government is imposing a one-off windfall tax to cover state expenditure that is not one-off. | Mostly true |
“When we impose a windfall tax, and a one-off tax at that, which has to cover state expenditure that is not one-off, that is the diagnosis of a problem,” Mostly true
The Draft Budgetary Plan for 2027, approved on 14–15 October 2026 and sent to the Commission and the Eurogroup, does indeed provide for a one-off 33% tax on the windfall profits of selected sectors: banks, insurers, retail chains, telecoms. The expected revenue is an indicative 800 million euros, the largest single revenue measure for 2027. The same plan provides for permanent increases in expenditure: pensions by about 8%, budget-sector wages by 5%, teachers' wages by 7.5%, higher child benefits. The target deficit for 2027 is 4.3% of GDP. The government does not tie the tax to specific expenditure, and the budget does not allocate the revenue to line items. “A tax that covers permanent expenditure” is an economic interpretation. It is logical, because one-off revenue disappears after 2027 while the spending increases remain, but it is not written in the documents. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: Недоказано (Г106) | |||
| 1:28:10 | Yotova | Yotova claims that the Constitutional Court did not declare the referendum unconstitutional, and that the proposal was simply not allowed through by the majority in the National Assembly. | True |
“It is not true that the Constitutional Court declared the referendum unconstitutional. Our proposal was not even allowed through by the majority in the National Assembly so that there could be a referendum. Mr Gyurov, don't mislead people.” True
The Constitutional Court has not declared the referendum unconstitutional. With Ruling No. 1 of 23 January 2026 it only dismissed as inadmissible the request against the National Assembly's decision, without ruling on the merits (Ruling No. 1). Radev's proposal of 12 May 2025 was first returned as inadmissible by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Natalia Kiselova. Later the Constitutional Court held that she did not have this power (Radio Free Europe). On 3 December 2025 parliament voted on the proposal and rejected it: 81 for, 135 against, 3 abstentions (transcript). The decision was promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 104 of 5 December 2025. Sources
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| 1:29:02 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that a deputy prime minister divides the media into good and bad, that the government decides which journalists get to ask questions, and that the Council of Ministers press service campaigns for a candidate – something unprecedented. | Mostly true |
“My question then is, when a deputy prime minister talks about good media, about bad media, when the press centre of the Council of Ministers is used in an election campaign to campaign in favour of one of the candidates.” Mostly true
In an interview with BNT on 13 August 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Ivo Hristov sets the public media against each other: he names BNT as one of the few places that “hold out” against the oligarchs, and BNR as the opposite example. The Council for Electronic Media calls the comparison “unacceptable”. The press service was used. On 26 October 2026, after the Sofia Economic Forum, Radev calls on people to “vote for Yotova”, and the Government Information Service distributes the statement on the Council of Ministers' website and Facebook page. In a statement the same day, the Government Information Service defends this and reproaches media that “keep silent about, distort, manipulate” the Prime Minister's words. The CEC (Decision No. 422-PVR) finds that this is not campaigning, because the campaign for the second round has not yet begun, and refers the complaint about the use of state resources (Article 168(3) of the Electoral Code) to the Court of Audit. On 30 October the Government Information Service takes the posts down. The two other claims are less well supported. On choosing which journalists get to ask questions, there is only a general statement by the Association of European Journalists that representatives of the ruling majority have shown a desire to restrict questions, with no specific cases. “No government until now” is an absolute claim that cannot be verified. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г108, Г113); Недоказано (Г109) – ЦИК: не е агитация | |||
| 1:31:09 | Yotova | Yotova says that she was director of news at BNT and that a prime minister appeared in the clock slot before the main newscast to beg a partner not to break up the “sglobka” (the PP-DB–GERB governing arrangement). | True |
“as it's called, in the clock slot before the Central News bulletin, suddenly a prime minister appeared who was begging another political party, which is simply a political partner, not to break up the sglobka.” True
According to the President's official biography, Yotova worked at BNT from 1990 to 1997 as a reporter, editor, presenter and director of the News and Current Affairs directorate. The case she describes, without naming the prime minister, matches the address by Nikolay Denkov (PP) on BNT1 at 20:00 on 24 March 2024, when the main newscast “Po sveta i u nas” also begins. In it Denkov calls on GERB-SDS to “keep its word” on the rotation, to vote for a cabinet with Maria Gabriel and “not to plunge the state into chaos”. At the time Denkov was from PP, the party in which Gyurov was an MP. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Й133) за БНТ; Непроверимо (Й135) за обръщението | |||
| 1:32:10 | Yotova | Yotova claims that after the arrest of two mayors Gyurov said that there was once again a Revival Process in Bulgaria. | Misleading |
“When two mayors were arrested, you said that in this way there is once again a Revival Process in Bulgaria. Do you still maintain that?” Misleading
In the interview on bTV's “Lice v Lice” (“Face to Face”) on 22 October 2026, after the arrest of the DPS mayors of Sungurlare and Belitsa, Gyurov does not use the expression “Revival Process” (the 1980s forced renaming of Bulgarian Turks). He says the fight against the oligarchy is important but the actions are “far too belated”, and asks whether this is a reaction to a broken deal between Peevski and Radev or “an attempt to intimidate Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Muslims”. He adds that he sees “shadows of the communist regime” once again trying to intimidate and use them. That is, he makes a historical allusion to the communist regime's pressure on Bulgarian Turks, but does not state that there is a Revival Process in Bulgaria. Yotova attributes to him a specific word he did not say and turns a question into a categorical statement. Sources
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| 1:33:21 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that he did not speak of a Revival Process, and that in the interview he said the fight against the oligarchy was belated and must be seen through to the end. | Mostly true |
“I did not talk about a Revival Process. What I said in that interview is that the fight against the oligarchy is belated, it has to be seen through to the end” Mostly true
It is true that in the bTV interview of 22 October 2026 he does not say “Revival Process” (the 1980s forced renaming of Bulgarian Turks) and that he says the actions against the oligarchy are “far too belated”. He omits, however, the other half of his answer: he asks whether the arrests of the two DPS mayors are not “an attempt to intimidate Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Muslims” and speaks of “shadows of the communist regime” once again trying to intimidate them. It is precisely this allusion that prompted Yotova's accusation. Sources
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| 1:34:44 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Yotova pardoned drug traffickers, and not in a single case but in repeated cases. | True |
“Will you apologise to Bulgarian mothers for pardoning drug traffickers” True
The official register of pardons of the presidential institution describes at least two cases of people convicted of drug trafficking and distribution who were pardoned on health grounds: case No. 23 – sentenced by the Court of Appeal in Thessaloniki to 15 years for importing, trafficking and selling drugs in Greece, pardoned for the remainder of the sentence by Decree No. 119 of 5 December 2022; and case No. 28 – convicted under Article 321(3) and Article 354a(2) of the Criminal Code and sentenced to 4 years and 4 months, pardoned by Decree No. 1 of 6 February 2025. Article 354a(2) of the Criminal Code is the aggravated offence of producing, possessing for distribution and distributing drugs (in large quantities or on the orders of an organised criminal group), and Article 321(3) is participation in an organised criminal group. Both decrees were issued while Yotova was Vice President: under Article 104 of the Constitution, the President may delegate the power of pardon to the Vice President, and during both of Radev's terms it was exercised by her. In total the register contains six people pardoned with drug-related convictions. The other four involve possession, driving after drug use or an unspecified offence under Article 354a, not trafficking. So the “repeated cases” of pardoned traffickers number two, no more. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Г115): укази от 05.12.2022 и 06.02.2025 | |||
| 1:35:17 | Yotova | Yotova says that she personally, with her own signature, provided the prosecution service with all documents on the disputed pardon. | True |
“Something. Regardless of everything, in order to be extremely honest, transparent and frank before all Bulgarian citizens, all the documents related to the pardon you talked about, I personally, personally with my own signature, provided to the Bulgarian prosecution service.” True
According to a statement by the President's press office, reported by BTA on 21 October 2026, Yotova referred the matter to the prosecution service on 19 October and sent the entire file on the pardon under Decree No. 119/2022. She asks for an investigation into the publicly made allegations of wrongdoing, including possible corrupt practices, and into how the camera footage from Sofia Prison was stored and disseminated. The prosecution service has not said publicly what it has done with the file: according to Sega, ten days later it is still unclear whether a preliminary check or pre-trial proceedings have been opened, and in which prosecutor's office. The referral comes more than a month after the scandal began, and the pardon dates from December 2022. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Й138): само в медии | |||
| 1:36:02 | Yotova | Yotova says that the medical commission she relied on was appointed by ministers Nadezhda Yordanova and Asena Serbezova – “people from your political party”. | Misleading |
“I had no reason to doubt a commission appointed by Mrs Nadezhda Yordanova as minister of justice and by Mrs Serbezova as minister of health. These are, after all, people from your political party.” Misleading
The factual basis is correct. Under Article 138 of the Execution of Penalties and Pre-trial Detention Act, there is a medical commission at the Chief Directorate “Execution of Penalties”, whose composition is determined by order of the Minister of Justice, agreed with the Minister of Health. According to reports citing the documents, the composition that gave the opinion in this case was determined in July 2022 by orders of Nadezhda Yordanova, agreed with Asena Serbezova (Petkov cabinet). “Your party” is inaccurate. Yordanova is from Democratic Bulgaria: in the 52nd National Assembly she speaks on behalf of the DB group, which is separate from the PP group. Serbezova was a minister nominated by PP, with no evidence that she is a party member. Gyurov is a former MP and chair of the PP parliamentary group, and is now an independent candidate backed by PP and DB. The misleading part is the shifting of responsibility. The medical commission gives an opinion on the state of health. The proposal for a pardon comes from the separate Pardons Commission at the presidency, and the decree was signed by Yotova herself as Vice President (Article 98, item 11 and Article 104 of the Constitution). Sources
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| 1:36:28 | Yotova | Yotova claims that she granted pardons only on humanitarian and health grounds and that it is not true that she pardoned drug traffickers. | False |
“And my decision as a whole was taken on humanitarian and health grounds. And as for your general claim about drug traffickers? First, that is not true.” False
The first part is confirmed: in the register of pardons, the reasons given under Decree No. 119 of 5 December 2022 are the convicted man's “extremely serious state of health” and that serving the sentence “would be a display of inhumane treatment”. Under Decree No. 1 of 6 February 2025, the reason is also health-related. The second part is false. The person pardoned by Decree No. 119 was sentenced in Greece to 15 years for importing, trafficking and selling drugs, and the person pardoned by Decree No. 1/2025 was convicted under Article 354a(2) of the Criminal Code (aggravated distribution) and Article 321(3) of the Criminal Code (organised criminal group). Both were convicted precisely of trafficking and distribution, regardless of the reasons for the pardon. The humanitarian motive does not change what the pardoned men were convicted of. Therefore the denial that she pardoned drug traffickers does not match the official register. Sources
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| 1:36:56 | Yotova | Yotova describes a pardoned young man in England whose extradition the English court twice refused; he had a three-year sentence and a seriously ill child who accepts food only from him. | Mostly true |
“One of these cases you're talking about, Mr Gyurov, concerns a young man who isn't even in Bulgaria. Twice the English court refuses to extradite him. After explicit pressure from the Bulgarian court, it refuses to extradite him so that the three-year sentence can be served in Bulgaria. Because, unfortunately, while he is in England, a child is born. A child who is extremely” Mostly true
The case is No. 11 in the register of pardons: a 41-year-old Bulgarian, sentenced in 2002 to 3 years suspended for possession of a high-risk narcotic substance (Article 354a(3) of the Criminal Code); for a new similar offence in 2015 he received 6 months, and it was ordered that he also serve the three years. He has lived in England since 2008; his child (born 2014) has a severe developmental delay and signs of autism. He was pardoned in full by Decree No. 1 of 9 January 2019. The detail “twice refuses” is inaccurate: according to the register, the English court of first instance granted the request for surrender, and the higher court overturned it and refused extradition. There was one refusal. The reason was the child's condition: experts on both sides indicated that without the father the child would stop performing basic life functions. The register does not explicitly mention food, but the description is close. The essential clarification is that this man was convicted of possession, not trafficking. So the example does not refute that Yotova pardoned convicted traffickers (see the decrees of 2022 and 2025). Sources
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| 1:38:39 | Yotova | Yotova claims that Gyurov got media to go after her husband, that his campaign was directed against her family, and that Asen Vassilev was his campaign spokesman. | Unverifiable |
“through whatever you can think of. With getting media to go after my husband. You personally, I'm not even asking about Asen Vassilev, who was the spokesman of your campaign.” Unverifiable
The publicly known incident involving her husband, Prof. Andrey Yotov, is from election day, 25 October: vlogger Nikolay Karakolev confronts Yotova while she is accompanying her husband, and distributes the video. After criticism he apologises and writes that he did not know who the man next to her was, nor that he had had a stroke. We found no evidence that Gyurov or his campaign ordered or encouraged this. On Asen Vassilev: the campaign website and public data do not list him as spokesman or as a member of the campaign team. He is chair of PP, a party that officially backs Gyurov, and has repeatedly spoken in his support, but as a party leader. The accusations of “lies, trolls and personal attacks” are assessments and cannot be verified. Sources
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| 1:39:45 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that Progressive Bulgaria blocked all attempts to obtain information and to hold a hearing on the pardons. | Mostly true |
“There was no personal attack there whatsoever. The question here is how you used these powers, how you applied them, on the basis of what criteria. Unfortunately, all attempts to get information, all attempts to hold a hearing on this subject were blocked by Progressive Bulgaria, so we couldn't get to this information.” Mostly true
As regards the hearings, this is confirmed by parliamentary data. On 7 October 2026 the proposal by Bozhidar Bozhanov (DB) to hear the heads of the Chief Directorate “Execution of Penalties”, the State Agency for National Security (SANS), GDBOP and the prison hospital on the pardon under Decree No. 119/2022 was rejected by 92 votes for and 119 against, and the revote produced the same result. According to the vote breakdown by group, all 119 votes against were PB's, while all other groups voted in favour. The three extraordinary sittings convened afterwards (13, 21 and 28 October) failed for lack of a quorum. On 13 October, of PB's 131 MPs, 14 registered, then 3; on 21 October 22 and 21; on 28 October 32 and 28. A quorum requires 121 members. Almost all Vazrazhdane MPs were also absent, and on 28 October so were around ten from GERB, but without PB a quorum could not be reached. “All attempts to obtain information” is exaggerated. According to the presidential administration itself, it answered 14 requests under the Access to Public Information Act (5 from MPs), and the Minister of Justice answered MPs' questions on the case. The hearings were blocked, not all channels of information. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г119): потвърждава отхвърлянето със 119 гласа на ПБ на 07.10, за другите опити не казва | |||
| 1:40:19 | Gyurov | Gyurov claims that MPs from Progressive Bulgaria widely shared collages showing him kissing a Ukrainian flag and with an assault rifle and a helmet. | Unverifiable |
“By contrast, as I said, the chair of the Progressive Bulgaria parliamentary group told outright lies yesterday, and Progressive Bulgaria MPs are massively sharing collages of me kissing a Ukrainian flag and with an assault rifle and a helmet.” Unverifiable
Gyurov did not name a single MP. Club Z writes that the collages shared by MPs from the ruling party had been deleted by the morning of 29 October, but gives no names, links or screenshots. No media outlet, archive or fact-check names a specific Progressive Bulgaria MP. One of the images certainly exists and is fake: the photo of Gyurov kissing a Ukrainian flag while standing on a Bulgarian one was generated with artificial intelligence, according to Factcheck.bg. It circulated in pro-Russian Facebook groups and on Threads, with no link to a specific MP. The collage with the assault rifle and helmet has not been published or checked by anyone. In the same remark Gyurov also accuses the chair of the PB parliamentary group, Petar Vitanov, of lying – this refers to Vitanov's claim of a meeting between Gyurov and Peevski, not to the collages. Neither PB nor Yotova's campaign has commented on the accusation about the collages. Until specific posts emerge, the claim remains unverifiable. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo.com: непроверимо | |||
| 1:41:19 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that Yordanova replaced only two people on the medical commission, which monitors the health of all prisoners, and that pardons are considered by a separate commission. | Mostly true |
“which was appointed by Mrs Nadezhda Yordanova, of course we carried out a check. It's only a matter of two people who were replaced. And this is a medical commission that monitors the health of all prisoners, not only of those eligible for pardon.” Mostly true
It is true that there is a separate Pardons Commission at the presidency. The register of pardons and the rules on its work describe it as the body that prepares the proposals for decrees, while the medical commission under the Execution of Penalties and Pre-trial Detention Act only gives an opinion. The description of the medical commission is exaggerated. Under Article 138 of the Act, it does not “monitor the health of all prisoners”. It gives opinions on specific cases: conditions for treatment before a sentence is enforced, complaints against refusals to interrupt a sentence, and proposals for pardon on health grounds. Pardons on health grounds are explicitly part of its tasks. We could not verify the claim that “only two people” were replaced under Yordanova: the commission's composition and changes to it have not been published. Nor did we find any information about the check Gyurov refers to. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано за „всички затворници“ (Г124); Потвърдено за отделната комисия (Г125); Непроверимо за двамата сменени (Г123) | |||
| 1:41:36 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that there is no medical commission document recommending the pardon, and that the pardoned man then went back to poisoning Bulgarian children with drugs. | Mostly true |
“Besides, there is another commission, which deals with pardons, and I would very much like to actually see the document in which the medical commission says this person should be pardoned. Because if we're talking about humane reasons, the humane thing, when a person is ill, is for him to be treated, not to be released, so that he then goes out and poisons Bulgarian children again […].” Mostly true
On the document: the register and the presidential administration indicate that the file contains an opinion of the expert medical commission on “extremely serious illnesses” with a risk to life. So there is a medical document on the state of health. Whether the medical commission explicitly proposed a pardon (which it may do under Article 138(1), item 3 of the Execution of Penalties and Pre-trial Detention Act) is not publicly known. The entire file is with the prosecution service. On the reoffending: the man pardoned by Decree No. 119/2022 was detained on 18 February 2025 in an operation by the Chief Directorate for Combating Organised Crime (GDBOP). According to media reports, more than 4 kg of cocaine were seized and he was charged with distributing drugs as part of an organised group. The case has not ended in a verdict and he enjoys the presumption of innocence. “Bulgarian children” is a rhetorical figure: there is no evidence of sales to minors. Gyurov presents the charge as an established fact. Sources
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| 1:42:14 | Yotova | Yotova says that the medical commission was not appointed at Yordanova's discretion but is constituted by law, and that the order bears the signatures of two ministers and one deputy minister. | Mostly true |
“it's not even appointed by Mrs Yordanova because she decided so. This is by law. It is constituted by law” Mostly true
The commission is indeed provided for in law: Article 138(1) of the Execution of Penalties and Pre-trial Detention Act establishes it at the Chief Directorate “Execution of Penalties” and tasks it with giving opinions, conclusions on complaints and “proposals for pardon of persons deprived of liberty on health grounds”. Its named membership, however, is determined by the Minister of Justice (or an authorised deputy minister) by order agreed with the Minister of Health (paragraph 2). The signatures match the description in the media: the July 2022 orders are by Minister Yordanova, agreed with Health Minister Serbezova, and Deputy Minister of Justice Emil Dechev also took part in the approval procedure. The orders themselves have not been published. Here Yotova partly contradicts her own remark from a few minutes earlier (p3-23), where she stresses that the commission was appointed by the two ministers. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Опровергано (Й152): законът създава комисията, но съставът е със заповед на министъра | |||
| 1:43:07 | Yotova | Yotova says that her administration received 14 inquiries about the pardons and gave 14 answers, and that she had no access to the parliamentary rostrum to defend herself. | Mostly true |
“And as for the claim that you didn't get an answer? That's a lie too. There were 14 inquiries to our administration. You got 14 answers.” Mostly true
The figure matches the presidential administration's own data. In the statement reported by BTA on 21 October 2026, it says that since 11 September it has answered 14 requests under the Access to Public Information Act: 5 from members of parliament, the rest from politicians, journalists and citizens. There is no independent confirmation of the number or content of the answers. The claim that she has no access to the parliamentary rostrum is inaccurate. Article 98, items 2 and 14 of the Constitution give the President the right to address the National Assembly and to inform it on matters within the President's powers. The parliamentary hearings that were blocked concerned other officials, not the President. DB initially proposed that the chair of the Pardons Commission also be heard, but withdrew that proposal. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Й151) за 14-те отговора; Недоказано (Й155) за трибуната | |||
| 1:43:33 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that he accepted all invitations to debate, while Yotova's campaign team turned them down. | Mostly true |
“because I accepted all proposals for a debate and, unfortunately, they were turned down by Mrs Yotova's campaign team.” Mostly true
Before the first round, the platform “Izvan Efir” (“Off Air”) invited both to a debate. Gyurov accepted, while Yotova's team declined in writing on 9 October, saying it would first wait for the first-round results. According to Club Z, Yotova also did not come to a joint appearance on BNR. On 13 September, on Nova, she said she would “never refuse a debate”. After the first round, Gyurov called on her to debate on election night itself, and the only debate is this one on BNT on 29 October, a condition Yotova had set as early as 13 October (a debate on public television in the event of a runoff). We found no evidence of other invitations for the second round (bTV, Nova) that her team declined. So “all” is exaggerated, but the refusals before the first round are documented. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г126) | |||
| 1:43:43 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that his first-round result exceeds the support for the parties backing him. | Mostly true |
“So we really did run a positive campaign, and this can be seen in our results, which increased the support of the parties backing us.” Mostly true
According to CEC data, in the parliamentary elections on 19 April 2026 the We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria coalition (Gyurov's main backers) received 408,846 votes (12.6%). On 25 October the Gyurov–Kandev ticket received 486,232 votes (31.95%), about 77,000 votes more, with a share more than twice as high. This happened with sharply lower turnout: 1,525,034 people voted, against 3,360,330 in April. The comparison between a party vote and a presidential vote is, however, only indicative. GERB and DPS have no candidate of their own in the presidential election, and some of their voters probably voted for Gyurov. The data do not show how much of his result is an “increase in support for the parties” and how much comes from other parties' voters. Sources | |||
| 1:43:55 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that the “muddy” campaign of scaremongering about sending soldiers to the front led to a collapse in support for Progressive Bulgaria – a loss of 900,000 votes. | Mostly true |
“By contrast, the muddy, dirty campaign with insinuations, threats of non-existent enemies, of wars, of sending soldiers to the front, led to a huge collapse in support for Progressive Bulgaria. We saw a loss of 900,000 votes.” Mostly true
The figure is accurate. PB received 1,444,920 votes in the parliamentary elections of 19 April 2026 (CEC Decision No. 4807-NS), while Yotova, whom it backed, received 528,951 votes on 25 October 2026, 915,969 fewer. The share also fell: from 44.6% for PB to 34.8% for Yotova, even though Yotova was also backed by BSP (97,753 votes in April) and others. The comparison, however, is between two different types of election with turnout halved (1.53 million vs 3.36 million voters). The “loss” is not a measure of voters who switched to other candidates. The cause (“the muddy campaign” and the war scaremongering) is a political assessment and cannot be verified. Factcheck.bg describes false claims being spread that Gyurov would send soldiers to Ukraine, but does not link them to Yotova's campaign or PB. Sources
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| 1:44:52 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that polling agencies were showing a 20% gap between the two, while the actual gap is under 3%. | Mostly true |
“By contrast, the 20% gap the polling agencies were showing was actually much smaller, less than 3%.” Mostly true
The actual gap is under 3 points: according to CEC data, Yotova–Valchev received 34.760% (528,951 votes) and Gyurov–Kandev 31.953% (486,232), a gap of 2.81 points. “20%” corresponds to polls from the start of the campaign, not the final ones. Trend shows 23.2 points at the end of September and beginning of October (47.8% vs 24.6%). The last polls, published on 23 October, show a smaller but still large gap: Trend 18.1 points, Gallup International 13.5, Alpha Research 12.8. The conclusion that the agencies greatly overestimated Yotova's lead is correct. The figure of 20, however, is closer to the upper bound than to the final picture. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Г130): потвърждава разликата 2,807 п.; за проучванията няма официален документ | |||
| 1:49:57 | Yotova | Yotova says that she performed the functions of Vice President for nine years. | True |
“Because I know the Vice President's job well. I performed those functions for 9 years.” True
Yotova took office as Vice President on 22 January 2017, was re-elected in 2021 and became President on 23 January 2026, after the Constitutional Court terminated Rumen Radev's powers early (biography). That is exactly nine years. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Потвърдено (Й157) | |||
| 1:51:56 | Yotova | Yotova says that she knows Gyurov so little that she has no opinion of him. | Misleading |
“As for Mr Gyurov? You know, I know him so little that I have no opinion.” Misleading
Yotova worked directly with Gyurov. By Decree No. 54 of 12 February 2026 she designated him as candidate for caretaker prime minister and handed him the mandate (president.bg). By Decree No. 57 of 19 February 2026 she appointed his cabinet, which governed for 78 days. In the same debate she herself says that Gyurov proposed something to her “at one of the meetings” with her. Half an hour earlier (1:38) she addresses him with the words “the way we've worked together, we know each other”, and in her closing remarks she recalls wishing him success on the day of his appointment. The degree of personal acquaintance is subjective, but the claim that she does not know him well enough to have an opinion contradicts their documented work together and her own words in the debate. Sources
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| 1:53:13 | Yotova | Yotova says that since January she has been talking to all parties and parliamentary groups and that “together we make caretaker cabinets”. | Misleading |
“I'm already doing it. Since January I've been talking to all political parties, I talk to parliamentary groups, together we make caretaker cabinets, together we make policies, civil sector.” Misleading
The talks with parliamentary groups are a fact and a constitutional obligation. In February 2026 Yotova held consultations with the groups before the choice of caretaker prime minister (president.bg). Not all took part: Vazrazhdane boycotted the consultations in early February (News.bg). “Together we make caretaker cabinets” does not match the record. Since January Yotova has appointed one caretaker cabinet, Gyurov's. Under the Constitution (Article 99(5), as amended in 2023), the prime minister is chosen from a fixed list and the line-up is proposed by him. At the time Yotova herself said that the cabinet “is not my choice”, that she bears no responsibility for its composition and that she learned who the ministers were when Gyurov read them out (president.bg, 19 February, president.bg, 20 February). Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й158, Й159) | |||
| 1:56:04 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that he has never spoken against Yotova or her family, whereas at her closing campaign event she devoted much of her speech to insinuations and lies about him. | Mostly true |
“unlike her, who at the closing event of her campaign devoted a large part of her speech” Mostly true
We did not find any statement by Gyurov against Yotova's family. Dnevnik's headline on the close of her campaign in Plovdiv on 22 October (“…and Gyurov is good for nothing”) shows that she attacked him in her closing speech. Whether these are “lies” is an assessment. “I have not spoken against Mrs Yotova” is too broad. During the campaign and in the debate itself he criticises her sharply, for example insisting that she apologise for pardoning drug traffickers. He probably means personal attacks, and we found none. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Непроверимо (Г137) | |||
| 1:56:51 | Gyurov | Gyurov says that the caretaker government he led had 78 days. | True |
“We had 78 days in the caretaker government. People shared that those days gave them hope.” True
The cabinet was appointed by Decree No. 57 of 19 February 2026 (State Gazette, issue 19/2026), and its powers were terminated by a decision of the National Assembly of 8 May 2026 upon the election of the new government (transcript, 8 May 2026). From 19 February to 8 May is exactly 78 days. Sources
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| 1:58:50 | Yotova | Yotova says that she appointed Gyurov caretaker prime minister and wished him success at the time. | True |
“And I wish you success, Mr Gyurov, just as I wished you on the first day, when I appointed you caretaker prime minister.” True
Yotova designated Gyurov as candidate for caretaker prime minister on 12 February 2026 (president.bg) and appointed his cabinet by Decree No. 57 of 19 February 2026 (transcript, 8 May 2026). The wish for success does not appear in the official announcements of 12 and 19 February. In them she speaks of high expectations, and on 19 February of reservations about some ministers and that the cabinet “is not my choice” (president.bg). This is a detail that cannot be verified, and it does not change the main fact. Sources
Other fact-checks zakogo: Недоказано (Й163): в новината от 19.02 няма пожелание за успех | |||
No claims match these filters.
This section does not judge whether something is true, but how it was argued. Both candidates had recurring moves that came back whatever the question: six each, in the order they appeared.
The Ukraine agreement and the Coalition of the Willing were presented as sending Bulgarian soldiers, three times, including after Gyurov agreed that no soldiers should go. The agreement's text contains no such commitment.
“Maybe you or your sponsors have a personal interest in this”, about drone production. Neither the sponsors nor the interest were named.
Instead of Gyurov's own record: Peevski and DPS-New Beginning, Kiril Petkov and Asen Vassilev. “What did you promise them?” is a question that needs no evidence.
“If you don't know this either”, “allow me some friendly advice”, “should you win through a very serious combination of bad circumstances”. The tone stands in for an answer on substance.
Asked whether her re-election would mean a concentration of power, she said she didn't see why she should answer. Asked whether she would apologise for the pardons, she shifted responsibility to the medical commission.
The Fiscal Council did criticise “fiscal tricks” around the 3% deficit. But “fake documents” is an accusation of a crime, made without naming a document or an institution that established it.
Low turnout and Progressive Bulgaria's result were explained by fear spread by the other side. The thesis is convenient because it cannot be disproved.
Criticism of the Ukraine agreement was answered with the BOTAS gas contract signed by Radev's caretaker cabinet. The comparison is legitimate, but it doesn't answer why the agreement was signed without asking parliament.
“I have never sought support from party headquarters”, while nominated by an initiative committee and backed by the parties whose parliamentary group he chaired until recently.
“There are no State Security representatives on our committee”, implying there are on Yotova's, without naming anyone.
An effective challenge that backfires: the agreement does contain sentences in which Bulgaria “commits”. They are political, not legal commitments, but they exist.
62 claims by Iliana Yotova and 63 by Andrey Gyurov were checked. For Yotova, 29 turned out false or misleading, almost half. For Gyurov, 11, about one in six.
The difference is not only in the count but in the kind. Yotova's most serious errors sit at the base of her argument: that Petkov and Vassilev cut off Russian gas (Gazprom did), that Bulgaria has never vetoed anything in the EU (it vetoed North Macedonia), that Gyurov's cabinet ran out of money for salaries (the fiscal reserve stood at €6.8 billion), that the excessive deficit procedure was opened at 5.8% (its basis is 3.5%), and that she pardoned no drug traffickers (the presidency's own register shows otherwise).
Gyurov rarely said anything entirely false, but he often rounded in his own favour. “We pay half a million every day” for BOTAS: the contract has been frozen since July. “I sponsored the decision on the French proposal”: the text was Hristo Ivanov's. “Seven years” of Radev as commander-in-chief: it was nine. “Name one text with a commitment”: there are several.
And some claims were simply wrong: that the Constitutional Court declared the euro referendum unconstitutional (it did not), that prices grew slowest during his cabinet (they grew fastest), and that the caretaker-PM list includes people appointed by the president (all are elected by parliament).
This check doesn't tell you whom to vote for. It tells you how far specific sentences, said on air in front of the whole country, can be trusted. Every one of them is here, with a link to the moment and to the document: check for yourself.
The full two-hour BNT recording of 29 October was transcribed with Whisper large-v3 and cross-checked against YouTube's automatic captions. Every quote links to the exact moment in the recording. Quotes are translated from Bulgarian; the Bulgarian version carries the original words.
Every claim that can be checked was extracted from the recording: facts, numbers, “you signed / you pardoned”, constitutional powers. Opinions, promises and predictions are not rated.
Both candidates were checked the same way, with the same sources and the same scale.
Every verdict rests first on a primary source: the document's text, the State Gazette, National Assembly transcripts and decisions, the Council of Ministers, the presidency, the Constitutional Court, the Ministry of Finance, the National Statistical Institute, the Bulgarian National Bank, Eurostat and the European Commission. Media are cited only where no primary source exists, and are marked “Media”. Source titles are left in the original language.
The results were compared with the fact-checks already published by Deutsche Welle, Klub Z and zakogo.com. Where the verdict here differs, the explanation says why.
If something is wrong, write to [email protected]. Corrections will be marked with a date.